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DIGITAL SERVICES TAX: A CROSS-BORDER
VARIATION OF THE CONSUMPTION TAX DEBATE
Young Ran (Christine) Kim *
The rise of highly digitalized businesses, such as Google and Amazon, has strained the traditional income
tax rules on nexus and profit allocation. Traditionally, profit is allocated to market countries where
consumers are located only if the business has a physical presence. However, in the digital economy, profits
can be easily generated in market countries without a physical presence, resulting in tax revenue loss for
market countries. In response, market countries have started imposing a new tax, called the digital services
tax (DST), on certain digital business models, which has ignited heated debate across the globe.
Supporters defend the DST, designed as a turnover style consumption tax, as an effective measure to
make up the foregone revenue in the digital economy because it is not bound by the traditional rules of
income taxation. Opponents criticize DSTs as “ring-fencing” or segregating certain digital business
models, discriminating against American tech giants, and arguably imposing a disguised income tax. The
debate has been focused on the imminent impact, such as who is the immediate winner and loser, but the
discussion lacks efforts to understand the fundamentals of DSTs, especially with regard to the
consumption tax aspect.
This Article is the first academic paper that highlights DSTs as a consumption tax and provides
normative implications for policy makers deliberating a DST. It argues that a DST, with certain
modifications, can be a good solution for the tax challenges of the digital economy. First, the Article offers
an in-depth analysis of DSTs’ economic impact in multisided digital platforms. Second, it offers the
advantages of DSTs over other types of consumption tax, such as value added tax and cash-flow tax.
Finally, it illustrates how the recent Supreme Court case of South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., which
discusses a sales tax imposed on certain remote sellers, and the subsequent Netflix Tax may shed light
on ways to overcome the ring-fencing problem of the DST.

INTRODUCTION
As Google, Amazon, Facebook, YouTube, and other highly digitalized
businesses become mainstream in the twenty-first century economy, they pose
new global tax challenges. The traditional income tax rules on nexus and profit
allocation, which allocate tax revenue among relevant countries, no longer work
effectively in the digitalized economy. Under the current rule, global profits of
multinational enterprises are partly allocated to market countries where
consumers are located only if the business has a physical presence in the market
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Utah S.J. Quinney College of Law. For helpful comments,
I am grateful to Ellen Aprill, Jordan Barry, Joshua Blank, Jorge Contreras, Heather Field, Miranda Fleischer,
Victor Fleischer, Ariel Jurow Kleiman, Omri Marian, Ruth Mason, Nancy McLaughlin, Diane Ring, Theodore
Seto, Daniel Shaviro, Stephen Shay, the participants in the Annual Meeting of the Law and Society
Association, Junior Tax Scholars Workshop, SEALS Annual Conference, UC Irvine School of Law
Trans-Pacific Business Law Dialogue, University of Utah S.J. Quinney College of Law Faculty Scholarship
Lunch, University of San Diego School of Law Tax Law Speaker Series, Loyola Law School Tax Policy
Colloquium, LatCrit 2019 Biennial Conference, BYU Law School Faculty Workshop, University of Vienna
Tax Conference, National Tax Association Annual Conference, AALS Annual Meeting New Voices in Tax
Law & Policy, and UC Irvine School of Law Tax Policy Colloquium. Special thanks to the University of
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country. 1 The traditional rule and the resulting revenue allocation were
considered reasonable in the twentieth century’s brick-and-mortar economy,
where multinational enterprises accessed consumers in the market country by
operating their business through a branch or a subsidiary. The branch or
subsidiary established a physical presence, or tax nexus, in the market country
by maintaining a physical connection in the country. 2 The profit allocation
rules then mandated allocating certain profits to the market country first and
the remaining profits to the home country of the multinational enterprises. 3
However, such conventional rules do not work effectively in the new digital
economy, where digital firms operate in market countries without a physical
presence and connect multiple groups of customers via online platforms.
To illustrate the concept of a highly digitalized business model, let us
consider the hypothetical example of William. William, who lives in the U.K.,
receives a bonus and would like to use it to purchase a new car. William is
particularly interested in a midsize luxury German sedan, and he begins the car
buying process by performing some preliminary research. He begins his
research by googling key words like “10 best sedans for 2019.” William skips
search results relating to Toyota, Hyundai, and similar sedans, and only focuses
on sedans such as the Mercedes-Benz E-Class, Audi A7, and BMW 5 Series.
After virtually touring some German luxury sedans, William remembers to
check the results of his favorite football club’s recent match and visits ESPN’s
website. Next to the results he was looking for, William finds an advertisement
of a Mercedes-Benz E-Class, which he is now more likely to click on than
before he began his preliminary car research.4
The above example shows the salient characteristics of highly digitalized
business models and the resulting tax challenges. Google is the highly digitalized
business model utilizing a multisided platform. William is part of a group of
users—user-buyers—and Mercedes-Benz is part of another group of users—
user-sellers or user-advertisers. Google, located in the U.S., offers digital search
engine services to the first group of users—user-buyers—located in various
countries, including the U.K., through which it collects a tremendous amount
of valuable user data. Google has a proprietary algorithm that allows it to offer
1. For the Internal Revenue Code’s (I.R.C. or the Code) term, this physical presence refers to a U.S.
trade or business, to which income of foreign service providers is allocated and subject to the U.S. tax
jurisdiction. 26 U.S.C. [hereinafter I.R.C.] § 862(b) (1986). A de minimis level of services rendered in the U.S.
does not constitute a U.S. trade or business if, for example, the services are performed while the foreign
service provider is present in the U.S. temporarily or no more than ninety days during the year. Id. § 864(b)(1).
2. CHARLES H. GUSTAFSON ET AL., TAXATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRANSACTIONS 182 (4th ed.
2011); U.S. MODEL INCOME TAX CONVENTION art. 5, 7 (U.S. DEP’T TREASURY 2016) [hereinafter U.S.
MODEL].
3. U.S. MODEL, supra note 2, art. 5, 7; MODEL TAX CONVENTION ON INCOME AND ON CAPITAL:
CONDENSED VERSION 2017 art. 5, 7 (OECD 2017) [hereinafter OECD MODEL].
4. The Google, German auto manufacturing company, and U.K. consumer example is inspired by a
similar example in Wei Cui, The Digital Services Tax: A Conceptual Defense, 73 TAX L. REV. (forthcoming 2020)
(available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3273641).
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improved search results to the first group, users in the U.K. who demonstrate
similar interests to those of William, because the algorithm learns how to tailor
experiences to individual user-buyers in the U.K. market. In addition, Google’s
algorithm offers customized advertising services to the second group of users—
user-advertisers or user-sellers—such as Mercedes-Benz, that want to launch a
targeted advertisement campaign to U.K. consumers based on their
demonstrated interests.5 Most of Google’s profits come from user-sellers or
user-advertisers rather than user-buyers in the market country.
Such highly digitalized business models did not exist when the traditional
income tax rules on nexus and profit allocation were formed in the early
twentieth century. 6 Market countries, or source countries in tax terms, are
entitled to exercise primary taxing rights on a multinational enterprise’s profits
generated from the market if the enterprise has a physical presence in the
market country.7 However, the newly emerged, highly digitalized businesses
can access consumers and generate profits in market countries without an actual
physical presence in the country. In the above example, Google, located in the
U.S., can render the search engine and online advertisement services to
consumers in the U.K. market without a physical presence in the U.K. Thus,
the U.K. cannot collect tax revenue from Google’s profits even though Google
accessed and gained a profit from the U.K. market and consumers.
Furthermore, the features of multisided platforms 8 make collecting tax
revenue by market countries from such businesses even more difficult.
Multisided platforms serve two or more distinct groups of customers or users
who value each other’s participation. 9 Users on one side of the market are
charged little to nothing to participate, while the users on the other side are
charged all or the majority of the profits.10 In the above example, Google does

5. Id. at 10.
6. Lilian V. Faulhaber, Taxing Tech: The Future of Digital Taxation, 39 VA. TAX REV. 145, 150 (2019).
7. OECD MODEL, supra note 3, art. 7.
8. Multisided platforms or multisided markets are often used by case law and literature on economics,
antitrust, and administrative regulations. See, e.g., Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274 (2018);
Jean-Charles Rochet & Jean Tirole, Two-Sided Markets: A Progress Report, 37 RAND J. ECON . 645 (2006); Erik
Hovenkamp, Platform Antitrust, 44 J. CORP. L. 713, 725–26 (2019); Eleanor Wilking, Why Does it Matter Who
Remits? Evidence from a Natural Experiment Involving Airbnb and Hotel Taxes (Apr. 25, 2020)
(unpublished paper) (available at http://www-personal.umich.edu/~ewilking/airbnb_current.pdf). In tax
literature, the multisided platforms are just referred to as “digitalization,” “digital economy,” or “certain highly
digitalised businesses.” See, e.g., OECD, ADDRESSING THE TAX CHALLENGES OF THE DIGITAL ECONOMY,
ACTION 1 - 2015 FINAL REPORT (2015) [hereinafter OECD, BEPS ACTION 1]; OECD, TAX CHALLENGES
ARISING FROM DIGITALISATION – INTERIM REPORT 2018 (2018) [hereinafter OECD, 2018 INTERIM
REPORT].
9. This refers to network effects. A network effect exists when the value of product or service provided
by a business increases according to the number of other users. CARL SHAPIRO & HAL R. VARIAN ,
INFORMATION RULES: A STRATEGIC GUIDE TO THE NETWORK ECONOMY 13 (1999). Such effects exists in
the highly digitalized businesses, such as Twitter, Facebook, Google, and Amazon, because the value of their
services to users increases as more users join the platform.
10. See Am. Express, 138 S. Ct. at 2281.
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not charge fees to retail users. Instead, it operates other business lines, such as
online advertising services, that connect different types of user groups—
user-sellers and user-buyers. Most of the profits do not come from the
consumers in the U.K. Technically, while Google’s revenue in this example is
relevant to the U.K. market because it collects and uses U.K. consumers’ data,
the profits are paid by German manufacturing companies. Thus, it is more
challenging for the U.K. to exercise tax jurisdiction if the business is located in
a different country and the group paying for the services—user-advertisers or
user-sellers—is located in a third country.
The preceding example illustrates the archaic nature of the traditional nexus
and profit allocation rules. As described above, under traditional tax rules,
market countries lose tax revenue simply because of the unique nature of highly
digitalized business models and their ability to infiltrate market countries
through their digital platforms without the need of a physical presence. In
response, and in an effort to recoup some of the lost tax revenue, market
countries, such as the U.K., France, and Italy, have unilaterally introduced, or
plan to introduce, a new tax called the Digital Service Tax (DST) for certain
highly digitalized businesses.11 This has ignited heated debate across the globe.
DSTs are designed as a turnover tax, which is a subcategory of consumption
tax, because policy makers think introducing a new tax rather than modifying
conventional income tax rules would be more effective to address the tax
challenges in the digital economy. However, the U.S., which is home to many
global tech giants, continues to oppose European DSTs because it believes
these proposals are discriminatory against U.S. tech giants. 12 Moreover, the
U.S. government has announced that it would impose additional tariffs up to
25% on a range of French imports, including handbags, soap, and cosmetics,
starting in January 2021 in order to retaliate against the adoption of France’s
DST.13
Realizing the need to offer a global solution for the tax challenges of the
digital economy, the European Union (EU), the G20, and the Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), which are important
voices in international taxation, have offered a couple of proposals, including a

11. See infra Part I.C.
12. See, e.g., Ruth Mason, The Transformation of International Tax, 114 AM. J. INT’L L. 353, 397–98 (2020)
(implying that such discrimination could be a political strategy, such as bringing the U.S. to the bargaining
table and pleasing their voters); Ruth Mason & Leopoldo Parada, The Legality of Digital Taxes in Europe, 40 VA.
TAX REV. (forthcoming 2020) (arguing that DSTs may be discriminatory in intent, but the Court of Justice
of the European Union would uphold such taxes).
13. Notice of Action in the Section 301 Investigation of France’s Digital Services Tax, 85 Fed. Reg.
43,292, 43,292–97 (July 10, 2020); ROBERT E. LIGHTHIZER, OFF. U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, REPORT
ON FRANCE’S DIGITAL SERVICES TAX (Dec. 2, 2019); Alex M. Parker, US Moves Ahead on French Tariffs over
Digital Taxes, LAW 360 (July 10, 2020), https://www.law360.com/articles/1291187/print?section=inter
nationaltrade; Alex M. Parker, US Proposes 100% Tariffs on French Imports over Digital Tax, LAW 360 (Dec. 2,
2019), https://www.law360.com/technology/articles/1224350/print?section=technology.
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proposal to modify current income tax rules and a proposal for a prototype
DST.14 All proposals attempt to give market countries greater taxing rights, but
none of these proposals have come to a consensus as to a solution. 15 In the
meantime, DSTs are widespread, becoming the new status quo.16
DSTs are levied on the gross revenue of a firm. In tax terms, this is a tax
on gross receipts called a “turnover tax” and is considered a subcategory of
“consumption tax,”17 as opposed to income tax. An important reason to design
the DST as a consumption tax is to reward market countries without being
restricted by the traditional international tax rules that require physical presence.
Market countries are where the relevant business activity and participatory user
base are located, and thus, a consumption-tax-based DST can allocate an
amount of profit to the relevant market country, irrespective of whether the
business has a local physical presence, so long as all other requirements are met.
In addition, DSTs apply only to a limited scope of digital businesses where tax
challenges primarily manifest, such as social media platforms, search engines,
and online marketplaces. 18 Furthermore, both global and local revenue of
digital businesses identified as in-scope businesses should exceed a specified
threshold amount of revenue to trigger DST application.19
However, current design of DSTs is not without criticism. First, DSTs are
criticized as ring-fencing, or segregating, certain digital business models from
the rest of the economy for tax purposes. 20 Second, they are blamed for
discriminating against American tech giants, such as Google, Amazon,
Facebook, YouTube, and Uber, because only those American tech giants can

14. The proposals will be discussed infra Parts I.B and I.C in detail.
15. Andrew D. Mitchell et al., Taxing Tech: Risks of an Australian Digital Services Tax Under International
Economic Law, 20 MELB. J. INT’L L. 88, 90–91 (2019) (citing various interim DST proposals and enactments
and the abandonment by the EU toward a regional DST structure).
16. Elke Asen, FAQ on Digital Services Taxes and the OECD’s BEPS Project, TAX FOUND. (Jan. 30, 2020),
https://taxfoundation.org/oecd-beps-digital-tax (showing that Austria, France, Hungary, Italy, and Turkey
have implemented a DST while Belgium, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Spain, and the U.K. have published
proposals, and other countries have shown intentions to implement DSTs in the future); see infra Part I.C.4.
17. JEROME R. HELLERSTEIN & WALTER HELLERSTEIN, STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION 649 (6th ed.
1997) (including the turnover tax as part of a list of consumption taxes including retail sales tax, use tax, excise
tax, and gross income tax).
18. See Commission Proposal for a Council Directive on the Common System of a Digital Services Tax on Revenues
Resulting from the Provision of Certain Digital Services, at 7–10, COM (2018) 148 final (Mar. 21, 2018) [hereinafter
EU Digital Services Tax Proposal 2018]; HM TREASURY, BUDGET 2018 DIGITAL SERVICES TAX (2018)
[hereinafter HM TREASURY, BUDGET 2018 DST].
19. EU Digital Services Tax Proposal 2018, supra note 18, at 10 (providing an international revenue
threshold of €750 million and a domestic threshold of €50 million); HM TREASURY, BUDGET 2018 DST,
supra note 18, at 2 (providing a “double threshold” of £500 million globally and £25 million of U.K. revenues).
20 . Daniel Bunn, A Summary of Criticisms of the EU Digital Tax, TAX FOUND. (Oct. 22, 2018),
https://taxfoundation.org/eu-digital-tax-criticisms/#_ftn16; see also OECD, BEPS ACTION 1, supra note 8,
at 149 (discussing neutrality as an important part of evaluating taxes on the digital economy); OECD,
ADDRESSING THE TAX CHALLENGES OF THE DIGITALISATION OF THE ECONOMY – POLICY NOTE (Jan.
23, 2019) [hereinafter OECD, POLICY NOTE].
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satisfy the revenue thresholds and be subject to a DST.21 Third, they are also
reprimanded for arguably imposing a disguised corporate income tax, rather
than a consumption tax, on the profits of certain digital firms to compensate
for forgone corporate tax revenue.22 If a DST is taken as a corporate income
tax, only home countries of digital firms could collect tax revenue from relevant
profits generated in market countries because traditional international tax rules
on tax nexus and profit allocation provide this to eliminate double taxation.23
One of the reasons that DSTs are designed as a consumption tax is to reward
market countries without being bound by the traditional international tax rules,
but critics attack the design of DSTs, interpret DSTs as disguised income tax,
and revert the issue back to the traditional rules setting where we cannot reward
market countries.
The criticism is largely based on practical concerns and focused on the
imminent impact, such as who is the winner and loser in the short term, rather
than considering DSTs theoretically. Furthermore, the criticism contains little
discussion of the consumption tax aspect of the DST, although the positive law
provides DSTs as a turnover tax and consumption tax. The third point of
criticism argues that although DSTs are designed as a consumption tax, it is
introduced to compensate for forgone corporate tax revenue, but it is not fully
convincing why, as a result, DSTs should be interpreted as corporate income
tax despite what positive law provides.24
As the first academic paper to highlight the consumption tax aspect of
DSTs, this Article explores the origin of DSTs and analyzes the key common
features of a DST that are distinct from conventional income tax. It offers the

21. See Initiation of a Section 301 Investigation of France’s Digital Services Tax, 84 Fed. Reg. 34,042,
34,042 (July 16, 2019); see also Ruth Mason & Leopoldo Parada, Company Size Matters, 2019 BRIT. TAX REV.
610, 646–49 (2019); Ruth Mason & Leopoldo Parada, Digital Battlefront in the Tax Wars, 92 TAX NOTES INT’L
1183, 1193–96 (2018); Jake Kanter, Amazon, Facebook, and Google Come Out Swinging After Being Slammed with an
‘Unjustifiable’ New Tax on Their Sales, BUS . INSIDER (Aug. 14, 2019), https://www.businessinsider.com/
amazon-facebook-and-google-lobby-french-digital-services-tax-2019-8.
22. See, e.g., Roland Ismer & Christoph Jescheck, Taxes on Digital Services and the Substantive Scope of
Application of Tax Treaties: Pushing the Boundaries of Article 2 of the OECD Model?, 46 INTERTAX 573, 577 (2018);
EU Digital Services Tax Proposal 2018, supra note 18, at 1 (stating that the measure to target revenues of digital
services based on user value creation underpins the Council’s intention to adapt corporate tax rules to new
digital business models).
23. Double taxation occurs in international tax when a market country (or source country in tax terms)
and home country (or residence country) levy taxes on the same declared income. See Alvin C. Warren, Jr.,
Income Tax Discrimination Against International Commerce, 54 TAX L. REV. 131, 133 (2001). Many countries enter
into income tax treaties to avoid such double taxation. Under the tax treaties, source countries offer the
reduced withholding tax rates for aliens’ income from domestic sources, whereas residence countries offer a
tax exemption or credit to foreign-source income. GUSTAFSON ET AL., supra note 2, at 63.
24. Countries may introduce consumption tax in addition to income tax or increase one tax rate to
compensate revenue loss resulting from the rate cut from another tax. See, e.g., Eimi Yamamitsu et al., Japan
Raises Taxes on Its Spenders Despite Growth Worries, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 30, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/
2019/30/business/japan-abe-consumption-tax.html; Fahim Mostafa, The Hungarian Experience Has
Strengthened the Case for Flat Taxes, FORBES (Jan. 27, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2017/01/
27/the-hungarian-experience-has-strengthened-the-case-for-flat-taxes/#5378c74cd477.
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normative proposal that a consumption-tax-based DST can be a suitable tax
policy to solve the tax challenges of the digital economy if the existing design
concerns are mitigated. When it comes to a tax proposal based on consumption
tax, there has been considerable theoretical discourse comparing the pros and
cons of consumption tax and income tax with regard to three criteria of tax
policy: efficiency, equity, and administrability (or simplicity). 25 Consumption
tax is considered more efficient and simpler, while income tax is considered
normatively superior to achieve equity. 26 Under the above criteria, the
consumption-tax-based DST can present its merits as being largely relevant to
business taxation and international taxation where efficiency and
administrability are more emphasized than equity. Furthermore, DSTs are
particularly efficient because, although the tax base is a digital firm’s gross
revenue, not net income, such a firm incurs almost zero marginal cost, reducing
the additional concerns of economic distortion commonly found in turnover
taxes.27 In conclusion, DSTs could offer a new path toward a consumption tax
in international taxation for the digital economy.
However, to maximize the advantages offered by DSTs and for them to be
a viable global solution for taxing the digital economy, further research and
improvement is required to overcome certain lingering issues. Moreover, the
study of multisided markets is still an emerging topic, and thus there is not much
tax scholarship analyzing these issues. This Article aims to fill the gap. It also
provides the following normative implications for policy makers deliberating a
DST or considering digital advertising taxes that benchmark DSTs to raise more
revenue during the COVID-19 pandemic.28
First, this Article explores the tax incidence of DSTs as a consumption tax
in the case of multisided digital platforms. Current literature significantly lacks
in-depth analysis on this issue. The early opponents of DSTs argued that a DST
would be borne by consumers and would adversely affect the demand side of
the digital economy.29 However, such critique neglected the characteristics of
multisided platforms, where service providers do not charge fees on consumers
or user-buyers. It would be more plausible to pass the tax burden onto
user-sellers or user-advertisers, who are also business enterprises, rather than
25. Some tax scholars label the third criterion of administrability as simplicity. See MICHAEL J. GRAETZ
ed. 2018).
26. See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Three Goals of Taxation, 60 TAX L. REV. 1, 11 (2006); see also Joseph
Bankman & David A. Weisbach, The Superiority of an Ideal Consumption Tax over an Ideal Income Tax, 58 STAN .
L. REV. 1413, 1425 (2006).
27. See Cui, supra note 4, at 25–27.
28 . See, e.g., Ruth Mason & Darien Shanske, Insight: The Time Has Come for State Digital Taxes,
BLOOMBERG TAX (May 29, 2020), https://news.bloombergtax.com/daily-tax-report-state/insight-the-timehas-come-for-state-digital-taxes-55.
29. Julian Jessop, Why the EU’s Digital Turnover Tax Is a Bad Idea, EUR . POL’Y INFO. CTR. (Sept. 5, 2018),
www.epicenternetwork.eu/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/Why-the-EU’s-digital-turnover-tax-is-a-badidea-1.pdf; Matthias Bauer, Five Questions About the Digital Services Tax to Pierre Moscovici, EUR. CTR. INT’L POL.
ECON. 4–6 (2018).
ET AL., FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 28–31 (8th
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user-buyers, who are consumers. This is the reaction of Amazon and Google
in response to the recent enactment of the French and the U.K. DSTs.30 More
interestingly, Facebook and eBay announced that they would not pass the
DST’s costs to its user-sellers or user-advertisers.31 A majority of the tech firms
subject to DSTs still remain silent. The divided market reaction proves the
importance of understanding the tax incidence of DSTs.
Second, this Article shows the advantages of DSTs over other types of
consumption taxes, such as a Value Added Tax (VAT) and a Destination-Based
Cash Flow Tax (DBCFT), to solve tax challenges in the digital economy. As to
a VAT, it would be difficult to define the “value addition” or “value creation”
by a digital firm. In the William-Google example, it is difficult to answer
whether and to what extent Google’s value is created by either engineers writing
computer codes of algorithm in California or by various user-buyers in the U.K.
By contributing user data, user-buyers like William allow Google not only to
offer the improved tailored experiences to future users but also to sell targeted
advertising services to German auto manufacturing companies. This
conundrum is analogous to the old debate regarding which country should
exercise the primary taxing right over the income derived from natural resource
extraction—is it the home country of multinational oil companies with
extraction technology or the source country with natural resources on its soil?
Considering that the natural resource problem has not been fully resolved, this
Article suspects that introducing a VAT may repeat the same problem
concerning value creation.
Another advantage that DSTs offer over other types of consumption taxes
is that DSTs can effectively reward market countries in a way that the traditional
cash flow taxes, such as a DBCFT, cannot. DBCFTs gives taxing rights to the
destination country of the sales of goods and services connected by the cash
flow because they posit that the destination of sales is the place where the
consumption occurs. 32 However, in multisided platforms, market countries
30. See infra note 232. However, whether such tax incidence on the user-seller side is normatively
desirable is another question. If one of the policy rationales of market countries to justify DSTs is the
monopolistic position of digital tech giants, then, in theory, digital firms ought to absorb the whole tax
incidence instead of passing part of the economic burden to the user-seller group. Still, there is no clear
explanation on what ought to happen based on economic model analysis and what is happening based on
empirical analysis. See infra Part III.A.
31. Announcement, eBay U.K., Protecting Your Business from Digital Services Tax Costs (Aug. 10,
2020) (available at https://community.ebay.co.uk/t5/Announcements/Protecting-your-business-fromDigital-Services-Tax-costs/ba-p/6701162); Stephanie Soong Johnston, EBay Won’t Pass U.K. Digital Services
Tax on to Sellers, TAX NOTES TODAY INT’L (Aug. 12, 2020), https://www.taxnotes.com/tax-notes-todayinternational/digital-economy/ebay-wont-pass-uk-digital-services-tax-sellers/2020/08/12/2ctsz;
Hamza
Ali, Facebook Not Passing U.K. Digital Tax Costs on to Advertisers, BLOOMBERG TAX (Sep. 3, 2020),
https://news.bloombergtax.com/daily-tax-report-international/facebook-not-passing-u-k-digital-tax-costson-to-advertisers.
32. So, for domestic tax purposes, receipts from exports are not included in taxable revenues and
imports are included in taxable revenue. For detailed explanation on DBCFT, see, for example, Alan
Auerbach et al., Destination-Based Cash Flow Taxation 9 (Said Bus. Sch., Working Paper 17/01, 2017).

22D53F6F -1778-4E8E-8A93-DA0F 31B227E7 .DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

140

ALABAMA LAW REVIEW

11/16/2020 3:03 PM

[Vol. 72:1:131

may not fall under the definition of destination under the DBCFT because the
cash flow exists only between the digital businesses providing services and
user-sellers. In the William-Google example, cash flow exists only between
Google in the U.S. and Mercedes-Benz in Germany. Thus, the destination of
cash flow is either the U.S. or Germany33 and cannot be the U.K.—the market
country to which all policy proposals aim to give more taxing rights. Hence, it
is inappropriate to recommend DBCFTs to reward-market countries.
Third, this Article proposes to improve the ring-fencing problem by
overcoming the limited scope of DSTs. Only search engines, social media
platforms, and online marketplaces are currently within the scope of DSTs and
subject to pay the DST, whereas certain regulated financial and payment
services and online content providers are excluded and thus exempted from
DSTs. 34 So, Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, Google, Amazon, eBay, Kayak,
Uber, and Airbnb are subject to DSTs, but PayPal, Netflix, Hulu, Spotify, and
Ubisoft are exempted from DST liability. However, the current distinctions
between in-scope and out-of-scope businesses are arbitrary and hard to justify
theoretically. It is not fully convincing to include YouTube and exclude Spotify
because their business models share many common features.35
To find a way to overcome the ring-fencing problem, this Article both
introduces the recent Supreme Court case of South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., which
discusses the remote sellers’ obligation to collect sales tax from the remote
buyers 36 and analyzes subsequent state legislation introducing the so-called
“Netflix Tax” because both developments could shed light on possible
solutions. 37 More than thirty state and local governments introduced the
Netflix Tax after the Wayfair ruling in order to require remote sellers to collect
sales tax—another type of consumption tax—from digital content providers,

33. More precisely, the destination is Germany in this example because sales of services occur in
Germany, and thus Google cannot include such receipts, or cash inflow, from this transaction in its taxable
revenue. On the other hand, the cash outflow, or expenses, is taxed in the origin country where such expenses
are incurred. Id. at 16.
34. See Cui, supra note 4, at 5–6.
35. The only difference is how much revenue derives from ad-based services—83% for YouTube and
10% for Spotify—and from premium services. However, the ratio between the two types of services itself is
not likely to be a good criterion to draw the line between the two groups of digital firms. See infra Part III.C.
36. South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2088 (2018).
37. The Netflix Tax is a sales and use tax imposed on the digital streaming of shows, movies, music,
and games. See Richard C. Auxier, Chicago’s Streaming Tax Is a Bad Tax but It’s Not a “Netflix Tax”, TAX POL’Y .
CTR. (June 11, 2019), https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/taxvox/chicagos-streaming-tax-bad-tax-its-notnetflix-tax. The content providers, such as Netflix, Hulu, and Spotify, that are excluded from DST are subject
to the Netflix Tax. Currently, the list of states and cities imposing the Netflix Tax is as follows: Alabama,
Arizona, Arkansas, Chicago, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa,
Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Maryland, Minnesota, Mississippi, Nebraska, New Jersey, New
Mexico, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota,
Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, Wyoming, and Washington D.C.
Id. However, the specific tax imposed by each state within the category varies widely.
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such as Netflix, Hulu, and Spotify.38 The fact that one type of consumption
tax, a DST, excludes online content providers from its scope and another type
of consumption tax, a sales tax, includes the same businesses within its scope
confirms that the current line-drawing of DSTs is arbitrary. Thus, DSTs should
overcome the ring-fencing problem by expanding their scope to other digital
businesses based upon close analysis of the nature of those business models,
rather than practical or political concerns.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I unravels the tax challenges in the
digital economy and the origin of the DST by exploring the discussions in the
G20, the OECD, and the EU. It further overviews varied versions of DSTs
that countries unilaterally adopted, or plan to adopt. Part II examines the key
features of DSTs, including the use of a turnover tax, revenue thresholds, and
their limited scope. It then critically analyzes the three important challenges by
which DSTs are particularly judged. Part III proposes that a
consumption-tax-based DST could be a normatively sound solution for the tax
challenges in the digital economy if current shortcomings are improved, such
as understanding tax incidence of DSTs, comparing DSTs with other types of
consumption taxes, and the ring-fencing problem concerning DSTs’ limited
scope. The Article then concludes with a brief statement concerning the
importance of scholarly discussion to the anticipated and necessary resolution
of digitalized business taxation in the twenty-first century.
I. DIGITAL ECONOMY AND THE ORIGIN OF DSTS
A. Digital Economy and Global Tax Challenges
When emerging digital technology companies, such as Google, started
providing free email accounts or search engine services in the 1990s, many
people anticipated that such highly digitalized businesses would begin charging
fees for their services. Nevertheless, Google and other highly digitalized
business models, such as Amazon, YouTube, and Facebook, have not yet
charged fees to retail users for significant parts of their services. Instead, they
operate other business lines, such as online advertising technologies, cloud
computing, and other online platforms that connect different types of user
groups, such as user-sellers and user-buyers.
Case law and literature refers to such highly digitalized business models as
multisided platforms. 39 In tax literature, the multisided platforms are just
referred to as “digitalization,” “digital economy,” or “certain highly digitalised

38. Jared Walczak & Janelle Cammenga, State Sales Taxes in the Post-Wayfair Era, TAX FOUND. (Dec. 12,
2019), https://taxfoundation.org/state-remote-sales-tax-collection-wayfair.
39. See Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2280–81 (2018); see also Rochet & Tirole, supra note
8.
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businesses.”40 These digital platforms connect multiple distinct user groups,
such as user-sellers and user-buyers, and provide them with certain network
benefits. A network effect exists when the value of a product or service
provided by a business increases according to the number of others using it.41
This so-called network effect is present in the highly digitalized business
models, such as Amazon, Twitter, and Google, because the value of their
services to users increases as more users use the platform. In the
William-Google example, Google collects a tremendous amount of valuable
user data by offering search engine services, and it can offer improved search
results to users as more users use the services. Recent tax-policy literature
describes this user data collection as “user participation,” because “soliciting
the sustained engagement and active participation of users is a critical
component” of highly digitalized businesses.42
However, the number of users participating in a digital platform is not the
only factor determining the value of highly digitalized businesses. The platforms
must have proprietary technology that allows them to offer improved services
as more users participate. In the William-Google example, Google has a
proprietary algorithm that allows it to offer improved search results to users in
the U.K. who demonstrate similar interests to those of William, because the
algorithm learns how to tailor experiences to individual user-buyers in the U.K.
market. In addition, Google’s algorithm offers customized advertising services
to another group of users—user-advertisers, such as Mercedes-Benz—that
want to launch a targeted advertisement campaign to U.K. consumers “based
on their demonstrated interests.”43
Thus, without sufficient technology developed for a platform, the highly
digitalized businesses cannot attract users. Without a solid user base, the
technology cannot realize its potential value. The synergies between the
intellectual property of the businesses and user participation is the key to their
success.44 In this context, a recent report of the G20 and the OECD explains
that the important features of digitalized business models include: (1) a
cross-jurisdictional scale without mass; (2) the heavy reliance on intangible

40. See, e.g., OECD, BEPS ACTION 1, supra note 8; OECD, 2018 INTERIM REPORT, supra note 8.
41. SHAPIRO & VARIAN, supra note 9, at 13.
42. OECD, ADDRESSING THE TAX CHALLENGES OF THE DIGITALISATION OF THE ECONOMY 9
(Mar. 6, 2019) [hereinafter OECD, PUBLIC CONSULTATION DOCUMENT].
43. Id. at 10.
44. This synergy is different from the so-called chicken and egg problem in multisided platforms in
that the former occurs between the platform and the overall users and the latter exists between different
groups of users. The chicken-and-egg problem refers to the causality dilemma where each group of users
relies on the presence of the other groups in order to derive value of the network. A platform wants to get
both the buyers and the sellers onto the network but sellers will not come on board until the buyers do and
vice versa. See, e.g., Bernard Caillaud & Bruno Jullien, Chicken & Egg: Competition Among Intermediation Service
Providers, 34 RAND J. ECON. 309 (2003).
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assets, especially intellectual property; and (3) the importance of data, user
participation, and their synergies with intellectual property.45
Many multisided platforms offer their services across borders. They can do
it without establishing a physical presence in market countries where users are
located, thanks to advanced technology in the twenty-first century. Also, in
many multisided markets, users on one side of the market are charged little or
nothing to participate, while all or a majority of the profits come from the users
on the other side.46 In the William-Google example, Google can offer search
engine services to William in the U.K. and online advertisement services to
Mercedes-Benz in Germany, both remotely from the U.S. Most of Google’s
profits do not come from the retail user-buyer group, where William belongs,
but rather from the user-seller group or user-advertiser group, where
Mercedes-Benz belongs.47
These new features of the highly digitalized business models have led to
global tax challenges. The traditional international income tax rules on tax nexus
and profit allocation, which allocate tax revenue between market countries and
home countries,48 no longer work effectively in the digitalized economy. These
businesses can generate profits in market countries without a physical presence,
and firms’ revenue relevant to the market country is not technically paid by the
consumers in the market. As a result, market countries cannot collect tax
revenue from digital firms that access the consumers and generate profits in the
market.
To be specific, in traditional cross-border transactions, global profits of
multinational enterprises are partly allocated to market countries where
consumers are located only if the business has physical presence in the market
country and only to the extent that profit can be allocated to that physical
presence. 49 In other words, product sellers or service providers must be
physically present in the subject market country for a substantial amount of
time and render sales or services there.50 A subsidiary or a branch in the market
country generally establishes physical presence of a firm, but a dependent agent
can also create the firm’s physical presence. 51 In tax terms, this physical
45. OECD, 2018 INTERIM REPORT, supra note 8, at 51–54.
46. See Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2281 (2018) (“Sometimes indirect network effects
require two-sided platforms to charge one side much more than the other . . . [and t]he optimal price might
require charging the side with more elastic demand a below-cost (or even negative) price.”).
47. See infra note 280 and accompanying text.
48. In tax literature, market countries more often refer to the source countries where the income is
produced, and home countries refer to the residence countries where the taxpayers maintain residence or, for
corporate taxpayers, are incorporated. David Eric Spencer, BEPS and the Allocation of Taxing Rights, 29 J. INT’L
TAX’N 142, 144 (2018).
49. I.R.C. § 862(b); U.S. MODEL, supra note 2, art. 7; OECD MODEL, supra note 3, art. 7, at 33–34.
50. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 864(b)(1) (2012).
51. See U.S. MODEL, supra note 2, art. 5; OECD MODEL, supra note 3, art. 5; GUSTAFSON ET AL., supra
note 2, at 182; Christian Ehlermann & Marta Castelon, When Does a Dependent Agent Act Habitually?, 83 TAX
NOTES INT’L 1141 (2016).
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presence refers to a “trade or business” or a “permanent establishment” of the
firm. 52 This physical presence constitutes a tax nexus, and then the profit
allocation rules mandate allocating certain profits attributable to such tax nexus
to the market country and the remaining profits to the home country of the
multinational enterprises.53
On the other hand, if the business does not have physical presence, or tax
nexus, in a market country, the market country cannot exercise tax jurisdiction
over the firm’s profits. This is where the traditional tax nexus and profit
allocation rules are constrained in the highly digitalized business models. Those
businesses can generate profits in market countries without physical presence.
Furthermore, most of the firm’s profits do not come from the consumer—the
user-buyer group in the William-Google example—in a traditional sense; rather,
most of the profits come from the user-seller or user-advertiser group.
The traditional physical presence requirement for a market country to
exercise tax jurisdiction was considered reasonable when the rule was developed
in the early twentieth century. 54 When a business renders services to foreign
customers, somebody must go to that market country and be present there. If
the business can render a service remotely, it is not enough to constitute a tax
nexus in that market country because there is no physical presence, and as such
the service is not considered a substantial presence.55 However, such rationale
has become inadequate as more businesses offer remote services. It is also
difficult to justify the rationale behind this physical presence requirement for
highly digitalized businesses with multisided platforms because firms’ revenue
relevant to the market country is not paid by the consumers in the market.
As a result, in the highly digitalized economy, market countries lose tax
revenue that could have been available to them from traditional business
models, and currently are unable to collect under traditional tax rules. Realizing
the need to address the tax challenges of the digital economy, the EU, the G20,
and the OECD, which lead international tax rules, have offered a few proposals
to address the issue, discussed in Parts I.B and I.D, all of which aim to give
market countries greater taxing rights. Many proposals try to modify current
income tax rules in various ways, while others attempt to introduce a new
turnover tax similar to a DST.56 However, these proposals have yet to reach a
consensus in the global community. In the meantime, market countries,
especially in Europe, have unilaterally introduced, or plan to introduce, a DST
52. See I.R.C. § 882; U.S. MODEL, supra note 2, art. 5; GUSTAFSON ET AL., supra note 2, at 181–82.
53. See OECD MODEL, supra note 3, at 175–77.
54. See, e.g., Michael J. Graetz & Michael M. O’Hear, The “Original Intent” of U.S. International Taxation,
46 DUKE L.J. 1021, 1088–89 (1997); Michael J. Graetz, The David R. Tillinghast Lecture Taxing International
Income: Inadequate Principles, Outdated Concepts, and Unsatisfactory Policies, 54 TAX L. REV. 261, 319 (2001).
55 . See OECD, 2018 INTERIM REPORT, supra note 8, at 51 (explaining the problem of remote
technology allowing digital businesses to “have an economic presence in a jurisdiction without having a
physical presence”).
56. All proposals will be discussed infra Parts I.B and I.D in detail.
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for certain highly digitalized businesses. Part I.C offers a detailed survey of
various DSTs.
B. European Developments: Modifying Income Tax vs. a New Turnover Tax
Having suffered prominently from the global tax challenges in the digital
economy, Europe emerged the front-runner of advocating a new tax framework
to deal with the growing digital economy. 57 In September 2017, the European
Commission (EC) began developing a proposal for a long-term solution that
extends the concept of permanent establishment in income tax and a short-term
solution that introduces a new turnover tax.58 This turnover tax, which is a
subcategory of consumption tax as opposed to income tax, is called a DST and
has become a prototype of various DSTs discussed in Part I.C.
The EC stated that its main concern was to ensure that the digital economy
would be taxed fairly, citing the growing market share of tech companies in the
European economy and the relatively low effective tax rates for digital
businesses. 59 The two main policy challenges noted by the EC were the
questions of where to tax—i.e., nexus—and what to tax—i.e., value creation.60
In the Communication released on September 21, 2017, the EC advocated for
a comprehensive solution, but also proposed three alternative, shorter-term,
solutions,61 one of which is a levy on revenues generated from the provision
of digital services or advertising activity, matching very closely to the eventual
final proposal of the EC.62
The 2017 Communication culminated in two proposals that the EC later
released on March 21, 2018. The first proposal, called the digital permanent
establishment proposal, was intended as a long-term solution and sought to
establish corporate tax rules for taxing the digital economy by extending the
current physical permanent establishment rules to those businesses with a
significant digital presence.63 Thus, as long as a digital business enterprise has
a significant digital presence in a market country, that market country may
recognize the enterprise’s taxable nexus to its jurisdiction even if there is no
physical or traditional permanent establishment of such enterprise in that

57. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council: A Fair and Efficient Tax
System in the European Union for the Digital Single Market, COM (2017) 547 final (Sept. 21, 2017).
58. Id. at 8–10.
59. Id. at 2, 4, 6.
60. Id. at 7.
61. Id. at 10 (proposing three short-term solutions that include an equalization tax on turnover of
digitalized companies, a withholding tax on digital transactions, and a levy on revenues generated from the
provision of digital services or advertising activity).
62. Id. The European Council adopted the conclusions of the EC on October 19, 2017. See generally
Presidency Conclusions, Brussels European Council (Oct. 19, 2017).
63. See generally Commission Proposal for a Council Directive Laying Down Rules Relating to the Corporate Taxation
of a Significant Digital Presence, COM (2018) 147 final (Mar. 21, 2018).
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jurisdiction. Thus, the market country may exercise its taxing right for the
revenue of such an enterprise. A business would be deemed to have such a
taxable nexus, or digital permanent establishment, for cross-border digital
business by fulfilling any of the following criteria: (1) annual revenues from
supplying digital services in a member state exceeding €7 million; (2) having
more than 100,000 users in a member state in a taxable year; and (3) business
contracts for digital services created between the company and business users
exceeding 3,000 in a taxable year.64 The proposal also included rules detailing
how member states may attribute profits to or in respect of a significant digital
presence, presented a non-exhaustive list of economically significant digital
activities, and was intended to amend member states’ tax treaties with non-EU
jurisdictions.65
The second proposal is the origin of the DST, originally intended as a
short-term solution establishing a common tax system targeting revenues
stemming from the supply of certain digital services. 66 The in-scope digital
businesses subject to the interim DST included: (1) the placing of digital
advertising targeted at users in a member state; (2) the transmission of user data
generated from user activity; and (3) intermediation services that allow users to
find other users and interact with them. 67 On the other hand, provision of
digital content, payment services, online sales of goods or services, and certain
regulated financial and crowdfunding services were excluded. 68 The interim
DST proposal included two revenue thresholds necessary for entities to be
taxed under the interim DST: (1) worldwide revenues exceeding €750 million;
and (2) taxable revenues within the EU exceeding €50 million. 69 Lastly, the
proposal set a 3% tax rate deemed to be “an appropriate balance between
revenues generated by the tax and accounting for the differential DST impact
for businesses with different profit margins.”70
However, since the EU released the above proposals in March 2018,
member states of the EU disagreed on both the long-term and short-term
proposals.71 The European Council finally rejected both proposals in March
2019.72 After the epic fail of the EU proposals, a number of member states

64. Id. at 16.
65. Id. at 17–18.
66. EU Digital Services Tax Proposal 2018, supra note 18, at 3.
67. Id. at 24–25.
68. See id. at 25; see also Council Directive 2014/65, 2014 O.J. (L 173) 349 (EU).
69. EU Digital Services Tax Proposal 2018, supra note 18, at 25–26.
70. Id. at 22.
71. See SEAN LOWRY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R45532, DIGITAL SERVICES TAXES (DSTS): POLICY
AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 6 (2019).
72. See Robert Van der Jagt, ECOFIN Discusses Digital Tax and Updates the EU Blacklist, KPMG,
https://home.kpmg/xx/en/home/insights/2019/05/etf-404-ecofin-discusses-eu-digital-services-tax1.html
(last visited Sept. 16, 2020); see also Outcome of the Council Meeting (EC) No. 7368/19 of 12 Mar. 2019 (PR
CO 12) 6.
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have moved fast to implement their own unilateral measures for taxing the
digital economy, discussed in the Part I.C.
C. DSTs as Popular Unilateral Measures
After the failure to either adopt a new DST or modify income tax by
expanding the definition of “permanent establishment,” several EU member
states have taken various levels of unilateral action. The unilateral measures are
surprisingly skewed towards introducing a new DST rather than modifying
income tax rules. 73 Non-European countries, such as India, Mexico, and
Canada, have also adopted or plan to introduce a DST. This Subpart explores
the most noteworthy DSTs in Europe and other countries, which can serve as
a preliminary exercise to understand the implications of DSTs on international
tax policy and to identify common key features of DSTs that will be discussed
in Part II.
1. United Kingdom
The U.K. was one of the early proponents of a unilateral DST. Although it
maintained its official position as waiting for the global solution for taxing the
digital economy, it eventually enacted a DST in 2020.74
As part of his 2018 budget, Chancellor Philip Hammond of the U.K.
released a DST proposal that resembles the EC’s March 2018 version apart
from a reduced rate and the introduction of safe harbors for businesses with
low profit margins or those taking losses.75 The U.K. proposal would apply a
2% tax, instead of the 3% tax suggested in the EC’s version, on the revenues
of specific digital business models where the revenues are linked to the
participation of U.K. users.76 The first major change from the EC version is

73. As of August 11, 2020, only four countries—Belgium, India, Israel, and Slovakia—have introduced,
or plan to introduce, a concept of “digital permanent establishment.” KPMG, TAXATION OF THE
DIGITALIZED ECONOMY 5 (Aug. 11, 2020). Ruth Mason commented that the conflict resulting from DSTs
is a proxy war for allocating tax revenue from cross-border transactions among countries. Ruth Mason, The
Digital-Tax Proxy War, MEDIUM (Dec. 2, 2018), https://medium.com/@ProfRuthMason/the-digital-taxproxy-war-1f618a0f8d43.
74. The U.K. still states that the legislation for a DST is an interim measure. See HM TREASURY,
DIGITAL SERVICES TAX: RESPONSE TO THE CONSULTATION 7–8 (2019) [hereinafter HM TREASURY, DST].
It became law in July 2020, retroactively effective from April 2020. Finance Act 2020, c. 39–72 (U.K.);
Stephanie Soong Johnston, U.K. Digital Services Tax Becomes Law, Stoking Trade Tensions, TAX NOTES TODAY
INT’L (July 23, 2020), https://www.taxnotes.com/tax-notes-today-international/digital-economy/uk-digitalservices-tax-becomes-law-stoking-trade-tensions/2020/07/23/2cr9q.
75. See HM TREASURY, BUDGET 2018 44 (2018) [hereinafter HM TREASURY, BUDGET 2018].
76. HM TREASURY, BUDGET 2018 DST, supra note 18.
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the implementation of an exemption to the tax for the first ₤25 million in
taxable U.K. revenues and a 0% tax rate for companies sustaining losses.77
The proposed tax would apply to business models that have revenues
linked to the participation of U.K. users and is meant to apply specifically to
search engines, social media platforms, and online marketplaces. 78 Financial
and payment services, the provision of online content, sales of software and
hardware, and broadcasting services would not be within its scope. 79 The
proposed tax would require businesses within its scope to earn annually at least
₤500 million globally to be taxable.80 The proposal also includes a local revenue
threshold for “relevant U.K. revenues” of ₤25 million as a means to ensure
small businesses remain outside the scope of the tax.81
In July 2019, the U.K. introduced a bill for its DST, with an effective date
of April 1, 2020.82 Uniquely, the U.K. DST bill provides a 50% reduction in
the tax for instances where the tax would overlap with a user subject to a similar
tax elsewhere.83 The bill received royal assent and became law on July 22, 2020,
retroactively effective from April 1, 2020.84
2. France
France is another country leading the unilateral change following the EU’s
epic fail in March 2019. In the same month of 2019, the French Finance
Minister, Bruno Le Maire, released a policy document detailing the country’s
unilateral approach to the DST. 85 The French DST is keen to tax the American
tech giants, such as GAFA, the acronym of Google, Apple, Facebook, and
Amazon, because, as Le Maire said, the emergence of such tech giants are

77 . Daniel Bunn, Revenue Estimates for Digital Services Tax, TAX FOUND. (Apr. 26, 2019),
https://taxfoundation.org/digital-services-tax-revenue-estimates. However, it is criticized that the safe
harbors are available to almost no businesses. Philip Hammond, the U.K.’s chief financial minister, stated
that the tax “will be carefully designed to ensure it is established tech giants—rather than our tech start-ups—
that shoulder the burden of this new tax.” Philip Hammond, Chancellor of the Exchequer, HM Treasury,
Budget 2018: Philip Hammond’s Speech (Oct. 29, 2018) (transcript available at https://www.gov.uk/
government/speeches/budget-2018-philip-hammonds-speech).
78. HM TREASURY, BUDGET 2018, supra note 75.
79. HM TREASURY, BUDGET 2018 DST, supra note 18.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. HM Revenue & Customs, Introduction of the New Digital Services Tax, GOV.UK (July 11, 2019),
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/introduction-of-the-new-digital-services-tax/introductionof-the-new-digital-services-tax; HM TREASURY, BUDGET 2018, supra note 75.
83. HM Revenue & Customs, supra note 82.
84. Finance Act 2020, c. 39–72 (U.K.); Johnston, supra note 74.
85. France: Draft Proposal for Digital Services Tax, KPMG (Mar. 6, 2019), https://home.kpmg/xx/en/
home/insights/2019/03/tnf-france-draft-proposal-for-digital-services-tax.html.
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monopolistic and they “not only want to control the maximum amount of [user]
data, but also escape fair taxes.”86
The proposal would subject digital businesses to a 3% tax on income
derived from: (1) the provision of a digital interface to enable users of platforms
to interact with each other in order to exchange goods or service; and (2)
advertising conducted on digital interface. 87 To qualify for the above-listed
income, subject to a DST, digital services must be made or supplied to French
users located in France.88 The user’s location is determined based on, among
others, the French IP address used to connect to websites, which differs from
the industry standard’s user-click criteria.89 The French DST includes its own
criteria in applying the tax only to companies earning at least €750 million in
worldwide revenue and €25 million in domestic revenue.90
The discussion in the legislative body moved quickly.91 Four months after
the discussion began, President Emmanuel Macron signed the new tax bill into
law on July 24, 2019.92 It is expected to raise €500 million per year.93
Although France is the second country that introduced a DST, the new tax
bill retroactively established the tax to collect tax revenues generated from
January 1, 2019, 94 which chronologically makes France the first country to
impose a DST. The retroactivity of the new digital tax sparked strong resistance
from American tech giants, such as Facebook and Amazon, arguing that “[i]n
order to comply, a company has to keep track of every user that observed an
impression on a device while in France, and every user who observed an
impression on a device everywhere in the world, back to Jan. 1, 2019.” 95
Recognizing the severe pushback, President Macron assured that the French
DST is an interim measure and that “France will reimburse any tax paid under

86. Liz Alderman, France Moves to Tax Tech Giants, Stoking Fight with White House, N.Y. TIMES (July 11,
2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/11/business/france-digital-tax-tech-giants.html.
87. KPMG, supra note 73, at 8; LIGHTHIZER, supra note 13, at 12.
88 . Jessie Gaston, Tax Alert: French Digital Services Tax (“DST”), DENTONS (July 15, 2019),
https://www.dentons.com/en/insights/articles/2019/july/15/french-digital-services-tax-dst.
89. Id.
90. KPMG, supra note 73, at 21.
91. On April 9, 2019, the National Assembly, France’s lower house, passed a bill nearly mirroring the
March 2019 proposal and the Senate, the upper house, amended the bill with a number of important changes
in May of 2019. France: Update on Digital Services Tax; Enactment Anticipated, KPMG (June 27, 2019),
https://home.kpmg/us/en/home/insights/2019/06/tnf-france-update-on-digital-services-tax-enactmentanticipated.html. The French Senate approved the new tax on July 11, 2019. Daniel Bunn, France Approves
Digital Services Tax; U.S. Explores Retaliatory Options, TAX FOUND. (July 11, 2019),
https://taxfoundation.org/france-digital-services-tax-us-retaliatory-options; Alderman, supra note 86.
92. Hamza Ali, France’s Macron Signs Digital Services Tax into Law, BLOOMBERG TAX (July 25, 2019),
https://news.bloombergtax.com/daily-tax-report-international/frances-macron-signs-digital-services-taxinto-law.
93. Alderman, supra note 86.
94. Ali, supra note 92.
95. Alex M. Parker, Facebook, Amazon Blast French Digital Tax in USTR Hearing, L AW 360 (Aug. 19, 2019),
https://www.law360.com/tax/articles/1188541.
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its digital services tax once there is an international deal on digital taxation.” 96
Also, the collection of DSTs has been delayed to the end of 2020.97
Despite the French conciliatory gesture, it is possible that this new tax will
escalate to a trans-Atlantic trade war. The U.S. Trade Representative proposed
tariffs of up to 100% on French luxuries, such as wine, cosmetics, and
handbags, claiming that the French DST targets American tech giants.98 France
warned that the EU would retaliate with its own round of tariffs.99 For now,
the two countries agreed to cool off while awaiting the global deal in the G20/
OECD expected in late 2020, but it is possible that France will not repeal the
DST regardless of the outcome of the global deal. 100 Recently, the U.S.
government announced that it would impose additional duties of 25% on
French products, such as handbags and cosmetics, starting January 2021.101
3. Other EU Member States
There are a number of other European countries that have already
implemented, or plan to adopt, DSTs, mimicking the original EU DST
proposals.
On May 16, 2018, Italy began a public consultation in response to the EC’s
March 2019 DST proposals.102 This public consultation eventually led to the
introduction of Italy’s own DST version on December 31, 2018, which is
modelled directly off the EC’s version.103 Italy’s DST includes the same 3%
rate, applicable digital businesses, and worldwide revenue threshold, but
modifies a domestic threshold into €5.5 million in Italian revenues. 104 The
Italian DST is effective from January 1, 2020.105

96. Matt Thompson, French Digital Tax to Be Repaid After Int’l Deal, Macron Says, LAW 360 (Aug. 26, 2019),
https://www.law360.com/tax/articles/1192446.
97. France Agrees to Delay New Tax on Tech Giants, BBC (Jan. 21, 2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/
business-51192369.
98. Parker, US Moves Ahead on French Tariffs over Digital Taxes, supra note 13; Parker, US Proposes 100%
Tariffs on French Imports over Digital Tax, supra note 13; see also Ruth Mason, France-US Skirmish over Amazon
Digital Tax Shows Why the Century-Old International Tax System Is Broken, CONVERSATION (Jan. 31, 2020, 12:13
PM),
https://theconversation.com/france-us-skirmish-over-amazon-digital-tax-shows-why-the-centuryold-international-tax-system-is-broken-130835.
99. David Keohane et al., France Warns US Against Digital Tax Retaliation, FIN. TIMES (Jan. 5, 2020),
https://www.ft.com/content/de451a5e-2fb6-11ea-9703-eea0cae3f0de.
100. Alex M. Parker & Todd Buell, US, France Fend Off Tariffs over Digital Tax Issue, LAW360 (Jan. 21,
2020), https://www.law360.com/articles/1236309.
101. Notice of Action in the Section 301 Investigation of France’s Digital Services Tax, 85 Fed. Reg.
43,292, 43,292–97 (July 10, 2020).
102. Robert Sledz, Italy Enacts Budget Law 2019, Laying Groundwork for Digital Services Tax, THOMSON
REUTERS (Jan. 10, 2019), https://tax.thomsonreuters.com/blog/italy-enacts-budget-law-2019-layinggroundwork-for-digital-services-tax.
103. See id.; see also legge 30 dicembre 2018, n.145, in G.U. Dec. 31, 2018, n.302 (It.).
104. Sledz, supra note 102.
105. KPMG, supra note 73, at 10.
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Very similar to the Italian DST, Spain released a preliminary draft bill for a
DST on October 23, 2018, that closely mirrors the EC version.106 Spain’s DST
would apply the same 3% tax rate and €750 million global threshold. 107
Similarly, the tax would apply to online advertising services, online
intermediation services, and data transfer services, but include several specific
exceptions and does not include an exclusion for intragroup transactions. 108
The draft proposal also included a lower domestic threshold of €3 million.109
The bill is pending in Parliament. 110
The Austrian DST has a narrower scope than the other DST proposals
because it limits the scope to digital advertisement services. The Austrian
Finance Ministry published its own digital tax draft legislation on April 4, 2019,
that would expand its current advertising tax to apply to digital advertising.111
This more confined version of the DST would implement a 5% turnover tax
on revenue derived from advertising services in Austria and would include the
same €750 million global threshold and a €25 million domestic threshold.112
The Austrian DST is effective from January 1, 2020.113

106. Spain Releases Draft Bill on Digital Services Tax, EY (Oct. 25, 2018), https://www.ey.com/en_gl/taxalerts/spain-releases-draft-bill-on-digital-services-tax.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. KPMG, supra note 73, at 11.
111. Austria: Update on Proposals for Digital Services Tax, KPMG (July 12, 2019), https://home.kpmg/us/
en/home/insights/2019/07/tnf-austria-update-proposals-digital-services-tax.html.
112. Id.
113. KPMG, supra note 73, at 6.
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Table 1 below summarizes and compares various DSTs that European
countries have enacted or proposed to implement.
TABLE 1. VARIOUS DSTS IN EUROPE114
EU
Proposal

Threshold115
€750/50
million

France

€750/25
million

Italy

€750/5.5
million
€750/3
million
€750/CZK
100 million
€750/5
million
₤500/25
million

Spain
Czech
Republic
Belgium
U.K.

Austria
Hungary

Poland

€750/10
million
HUF 100
million (no
local
threshold)
n/a

Scope
Advertisement/
Digital interfaces,
intermediation, online
marketplace/
Data transfer, resale of
private data
Same as above

Rate
3%

Effective
(failed)

3%

Same as above

3%

2019
(collection
postponed
until Dec.
2020)
2020

Same as above

3%

Same as above

5%

Selling of user data

3%

Search engines/
Digital interfaces,
intermediation, online
marketplace/
Social media
Advertisement

2%

2020
(expected)
2021
(expected)
n/a
(proposed)
2020

5%

2020

Advertisement

7.5%,
temporarily
0% (July
2019 –
Dec. 2022)
1.5%

2017

Audio-visual media
service and audiovisual commercial
communication

2020

114. Table 1 is created by the author based on the survey performed by KPMG. Id.
115. The first amount refers to the global revenue threshold, and the second amount refers to the
domestic revenue threshold.
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4. Beyond Europe: DSTs as Status Quo
In addition to the EU member states, many countries, ranging from
Canada 116 to South Africa, have enacted, proposed, or publicly discussed
DSTs. Chart 1 below shows the current status of the DST legislation in various
countries as of August 2020.
CHART 1. CURRENT STATUS OF DST LEGISLATION117

About thirty countries have followed suit and either enacted, proposed, or
considered a DST. Michael Graetz commented at a recent conference that the
current nexus and profit allocation rules are no longer status quo; status quo
has become each country unilaterally adopting its own DST without
coordination.118

116. After the election in late 2019, Canada has expressed its intent to introduce a 3% DST for certain
digital industries, which mimics the French DST. The global revenue threshold amount is CAD 1 billion and
the local revenue threshold is CAD 40 million. OFF. PARLIAMENTARY BUDGET OFFICER, COST ESTIMATE
OF ELECTION CAMPAIGN PROPOSAL (Sept. 19, 2019).
117. Chart 1 is created by the author based on the data released by KPMG. KPMG, supra note 73.
Below is the list of countries in Chart 1.
Countries where a DST has been implemented are colored in black: Austria, France, Hungary, India
(Equalisation Levy), Indonesia (Electronic Transaction Tax), Italy, Kenya, Paraguay, Poland, Tunisia, Turkey,
and the United Kingdom.
Countries that have proposed or publicly considered a DST are colored in gray: Belgium, Brazil, Canada,
Czech Republic, Denmark, Egypt, Israel, Latvia, New Zealand, Norway, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia,
South Africa, South Korea, and Spain.
Countries that have enacted or are considering income-tax-based approaches, including Costa Rica, Greece,
Malaysia, Mexico, Nigeria, Taiwan, Uruguay, Vietnam, and Zimbabwe, are not included in Chart 1.
118. Michael Graetz, Professor of Tax Law, Columbia Law Sch., Speech at the 2019 USCIB/OECD
International Tax Conference (June 3, 2019).
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There are two countries, India and Turkey, whose DSTs show notable
variations from the general features discussed in Part II.A below. India has
undertaken two significant unilateral actions in taxing the digital economy since
2016. First, as part of the Indian Government’s Finance Act of 2016,119 the
country introduced a turnover-based tax designated as an “equalisation levy,”120
which is comparable to a DST. Second, in 2018, following India’s participation
and review of the OECD’s BEPS continuing research, the country also
expanded the definition of PE in its income tax statute to include digital
companies that would otherwise not be taxed due to their lack of physical
presence in India.121 Hence, India has adopted both a consumption-tax-based
solution and an income-tax-based solution.
Turkey became one of the latest countries to introduce a DST.122 Turkey’s
newly enacted 7.5% DST is effective on March 1, 2020.123 It is noteworthy that
Turkey’s DST is not only higher in tax rate than the DST enacted by France
and the U.K. but also broader in scope because it applies to sales of digital
content online as well.124
D. G20 and the OECD’s Work
While many countries consider adopting a new DST unilaterally, the
OECD and G20 have been working on a global deal to resolve the tax

119. Finance Act, 2016, No. 28, Acts of Parliament, 2016 (India).
120. Id. § 165(1). The Finance Act followed from India reacting relatively quickly to the OECD’s BEPS
Action Report 1 that recommended an equalization levy as one of three potential solutions to taxing the
digital economy. OECD, BEPS ACTION 1, supra note 8, at 115–16. The act imposes a 6% turnover tax on
the gross revenues of foreign online advertising companies that do not have traditional PE in India. Id.
§ 165(1). However, the levy is only applicable to those transactions that aggregate to more than INR 100,000
(approximately USD 1,500) in a financial year. Id. § 165(2)(b). The specified services subject to the
equalization levy may be expanded in scope and are defined as an “online advertisement, any provision for
digital advertising space or any other facility or service for the purpose of online advertisement and include[]
other service[s] as may be notified by the Central Government.” Id. § 164(i). The levy came into effect as of
June 1, 2016. KPMG, supra note 73, at 25.
121. Finance Bill, 2018, No. 4, Acts of Parliament, 2019 (India). India expanded the definition of PE
by introducing the significant economic presence (SEP) concept in the amendment of the Income-tax Act.
The purpose of the amendment was to establish SEP of foreign digital companies and tax those entities and
other foreign companies with traditional PE alike. The SEP amendments were set to come into force April
1, 2018. Id. §§ 1(2), 4(2). In sum, the SEP changes seek to make income attributable to any significant
economic presence to be considered as taxable income in India. S.R. Patnaik, Taxing the Digital Economy: The
Rule of ‘Significant Economic Presence’, CYRIL AMARCHAND MANGALDAS BLOGS (Mar. 21, 2018),
https://tax.cyrilamarchandblogs.com/2018/03/taxing-digital-economy-rule-significant-economic-presence.
122. KPMG, TURKEY: DIGITAL SERVICES TAX ENACTED, EFFECTIVE DATE OF MARCH 2020 (Dec.
11, 2019), https://home.kpmg/us/en/home/insights/2019/12/tnf-digital-services-tax-enacted-effectivemarch-2020.html.
123. KPMG, supra note 73, at 12.
124. It applies to sales of digital content, which France’s law excludes, and also eliminates other
exemptions in the French legislation such as revenue from information gathered by sensors. Alex M. Parker,
Turkey Enacts 7.5% Digital Services Tax, L AW360 (Dec. 12, 2019), https://www.law360.com/tax/articles/1227
913.
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challenges in the digital economy. The OECD/G20 proposals, first released in
early 2019 and updated in October 2019, reject the DST-based approach and
rather modify the traditional income tax rules. It would allocate a digital firm’s
income between the market countries and the firm’s home country based on a
new formula according to sales and some online activities, regardless of whether
the firm has physical presence in the market countries.125
Aggressive tax planning strategies by multinational enterprises have been
the center of the fiscal agenda among many countries since the financial crisis
in 2008. 126 For example, source countries, where investments occur and
income is produced, suffer from tax base erosion by taxpayers, whereas
residence countries, where investors reside, suffer from profit shifting to lowtax countries. In order to combat such base erosion and profit shifting (BEPS)
arising from multinational enterprises’ clever use of gaps and mismatches in tax
rules, the OECD and G20 initiated the BEPS project in 2013, which resulted
in fifteen final reports containing action plans for each topic in 2015. 127
Furthermore, the working parties realized the need to collaborate with more
countries beyond the OECD and G20 to implement the goal of the BEPS
project, so they created the OECD/G20 Inclusive Framework on BEPS, within
which over 130 countries and jurisdictions are working together to tackle tax
avoidance globally.128
Among those fifteen final reports and action plans, it is symbolic that
Action 1 is “Addressing the Tax Challenges of the Digital Economy.” 129 The
report not only recognized the tax challenges arising from the digitalization of
the economy but also noted that it would be “difficult, if not impossible, to
ring-fence the digital economy from the rest of the economy for tax purposes”
because of the increasingly pervasive nature of digitalization. 130 The limitations
addressed in Action 1 indicate that the tax challenges raised by digitalization go
beyond the base erosion or profit shifting issues because the remaining
challenges relate to how taxing rights among relevant countries should be
allocated.
The OECD/G20 continued to analyze the tax challenges in the digital
economy and produced several reports, with a hope to form the basis for
consensus by 2020. The reports include Tax Challenges Arising from Digitalisation–

125. See, e.g., OECD, SECRETARIAT PROPOSAL FOR A “UNIFIED APPROACH” UNDER PILLAR ONE 8–
9 (Nov. 2, 2019) [hereinafter OECD, UNIFIED APPROACH].
126. History of the G20 & BEPS, OECD, https://www.oecd.org/tax/beps/about/#history (last visited
Sept. 17, 2020).
127. What is BEPS?, OECD, https://www.oecd.org/tax/beps/about/ (last visited Sept. 17, 2020).
128. Id.
129. OECD, BEPS ACTION 1, supra note 8.
130. Id. at 11.
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Interim Report in March 2018,131 a policy note in January 2019,132 the Public
Consultation Document in February 2019,133 and the Programme of Work to Develop
a Consensus Solution to the Tax Challenges Arising from the Digitalisation of the Economy
(Programme of Work) in May 2019. 134 The proposals offered in these
documents can be sorted into three categories. The first category is expanding
the tax nexus rules to include significant digital presence and introducing new
profit allocation rules based on formulae according to sales and some online
activities (Significant Economic Presence Proposal or Fractional
Apportionment Method).135 The second category is modifying profit allocation
rules to reallocate an amount of income deriving from specific intellectual
properties, called residual profit, to market countries (Marketing Intangibles
Proposal or Modified Residual Profit Split Method).136 The third category is
modifying profit allocation rules to require an amount of profit be allocated to
market countries where user participation is active, irrespective of whether the
businesses have a local physical presence or tax nexus (User Participation
Proposal or Distribution-Based Approaches). 137 The third proposal is the
131. OECD, 2018 INTERIM REPORT, supra note 8.
132. OECD, POLICY NOTE, supra note 20. This 2019 policy note explains that the OECD will examine
the tax challenges under two separate pillars while hoping to form the basis for consensus by 2020. Pillar 1,
which is relevant to this Article, examines how to modify the traditional nexus and allocation rules to give
market jurisdictions greater rights to assert tax nexus and be entitled to a share of multinational enterprises’
taxable income. Id. at 2. Pillar 2 seeks to further combat against the BEPS issue in the context of digitalization.
See id. Pillar 1 is relevant to this Article, whereas Pillar 2 seeks to extend the policies that the U.S. tax reform
recently adopted, especially the global intangible low-income tax (GILTI) minimum tax and the base erosion
and antiabuse tax (BEAT).
133. OECD, PUBLIC CONSULTATION DOCUMENT, supra note 42.
134 . OECD, PROGRAMME OF WORK TO DEVELOP A CONSENSUS SOLUTION TO THE TAX
CHALLENGES ARISING FROM THE DIGITALISATION OF THE ECONOMY (May 29, 2019).
135. Many developing countries, such as those in the G24, endorse this proposal. It aims to reward
market countries by abandoning the traditional residency-based nexus rules in favor of economic nexus which
would include digital presence. Furthermore, it adopts a formulary apportionment approach where the tax
base is computed by applying the global profit rate of the multinational enterprise group to the revenue
generated in a particular jurisdiction. Such a tax base is allocated based on apportionment factors, such as
sales, assets, employees, and importantly, users. It targets a wider scope than either of the User Participation
or Marketing Intangibles proposals. OECD, PUBLIC CONSULTATION DOCUMENT, supra note 42, at 16–17.
136. The second proposal is supported by the U.S. This proposal is similar to the current residual profit
split method in transfer pricing which distinguishes the multinational enterprises’ non-routine or residual
profit from routine profit. But this proposal requires only a portion of the nonroutine from in-scope activities
or assets to be allocated to the market jurisdiction. All other routine and nonroutine profit would continue
to be allocated based on existing profit allocation principles. See Itai Grinberg, International Taxation in an Era
of Digital Disruption: Analyzing the Current Debate, TAXES 85, 98–101 (2019), for a distinction of residual profit
from routine profit. Thus, going beyond highly digitalized businesses, it could reach a wider scope than the
User Participation Proposal. However, it also departs from the traditional arm’s length principle, therefore
making it difficult to satisfy the DST advocates. OECD, PUBLIC CONSULTATION DOCUMENT, supra note 42,
at 11–16.
137. The User Participation Proposal, supported by the U.K. and France, is premised on the idea that
soliciting the sustained engagement and active participation of users is a critical component of value creation
for certain highly digitalized businesses. The activities and participation of these users contribute to the
creation of the brand, the generation of valuable data, and the development of a critical mass of users, which
helps to establish market power. Consequently, it targets certain highly digitalized businesses, such as social
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closest to a DST because it emphasizes user participation; but it is different
from a DST because it maintains the income tax framework and rejects a new
DST. All three proposals attempt to give market countries greater taxing rights
but are different as to how and to what extent they modify the taxing rights.
After discussing the previous proposals, the OECD Secretariat proposed a
“Unified Approach” in October 2019.138 The proposal covers highly digitalized
business models but is increased in scope to include consumer-facing
businesses.139 It creates two new rules: (1) a new nexus rule, not dependent on
physical presence and instead largely based on sales; and (2) a new profit
allocation rule using a formulaic approach to determine the share of residual,
or non-routine, profit allocated to market countries.140 Although it clings to the
income tax framework, it goes beyond the existing norms, such as the arm’s
length principle—income should be allocated among relevant countries at what
independent parties would have paid—and physical presence requirements.141
It aims to offer a possible consensus-based solution to be agreed to by the end
of 2020.
Yet, the Secretariat’s proposal is seen as “excessively cautious” and
insufficient in reforming current international tax rules for the digital
economy.142 It is a nice combination of all of the previous proposals, but at the
same time it introduces another layer of complexity to the already-complex
international tax rules.143 Also, it is not enough to reward the market countries:
most corporate profits would still be taxed under current rules, and market
countries may exercise new taxing rights only on a very small portion of profits

media platforms, search engines, and online marketplaces. For those businesses, nonroutine or residual profit
in excess of routine profit, which is generated from user participation, is required to be allocated to market
countries where the relevant businesses’ active and participatory user bases are located, irrespective of
whether the businesses have a local physical presence. OECD, PUBLIC CONSULTATION DOCUMENT, supra
note 42, at 9–11.
138. OECD, UNIFIED APPROACH, supra note 125.
139. Id. at 5.
140 . The Unified Approach creates a three-tier mechanism for apportioning a multinational
enterprise’s profits to various countries. First, Amount A is the deemed residual profit or deemed nonroutine
profit, which gets allocated among the various market countries even when an enterprise does not have a
physical presence. Second, if the enterprise has a traditional tax nexus, such as physical presence in a marke t
country, an additional amount—i.e., Amount B—attributed for baseline marketing and distribution functions
may further be allocated to that country under current rules for transfer pricing and permanent establishment.
Third, there might be a case where the market country argues that it may seek to tax an additional profit in
excess of Amount B—i.e., Amount C—due to extra functions in that country. Then, the dispute over
Amount C between the market country and the taxpayer should be subject to a legally binding and effective
dispute prevention and resolution mechanism. Id. at 9.
141. Id.; Alex M. Parker, Mnuchin Has ‘Serious Concerns’ with OECD Digital Tax Plan, LAW360 (Dec. 4,
2019), https://www.law360.com/tax/articles/1225261.
142. Isabel Gottlieb, OECD’s Global Tax Overhaul Too Cautious, Trade Union Group Says, BLOOMBERG
TAX (Feb. 5, 2020), https://www.bloomberglaw.com/product/tax/document/X8EF0IGS000000?bna_
news_filter=daily-tax-report-international&jcsearch=BNA%252000000170167ddcd9a5f3b67df0a00001#j
cite.
143. Id.
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that meet several thresholds.144 If a firm does not have physical presence, the
new taxing rights are further limited.145
Furthermore, it becomes unclear whether a global deal can be reached on
the Secretariat’s proposal because the U.S. wants to pause the negotiation on
the digital tax reform. 146 U.S. Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin sent the
OECD a letter in December 2019, expressing concerns that the proposal
departs too far from the existing rules and asking to add a safe harbor that
would allow U.S. companies to choose between the new and old regimes.147
The OECD has dismissed the idea of an alternative safe harbor, 148 and there is
no sign of a compromise.
Thus, many countries are more likely to maintain DSTs even after 2020,
which has been implied by U.K., French, and German government officials.149
Also, Austria, France, Italy, Poland, Turkey, and the U.K., among others, have
implemented DSTs during the year 2020.150 The current status confirms an
earlier observation of Michael Graetz that the existing global tax norms in
income taxation, such as nexus and profit allocation, are outdated and that
DSTs are the status quo. To better understand DSTs, Part II analyzes how
positive law provides DSTs and critically evaluates the merits and demerits of
DSTs compared to conventional income-tax-based approaches.
II. THE ANATOMY OF DSTS
This Part explains how positive law provides DSTs by showing key design
features that are common in various DSTs that have been enacted or proposed.
An important feature of a DST is that it is designed as a turnover tax, which is
a subcategory of a consumption tax. Given that the goal of a DST is to reward
market countries’ tax revenue, a consumption-tax-based approach is considered
effective because it taxes digital platforms in a way that the traditional income
144. See, e.g., Jeroen Lammers, OECD Unified Approach Leaves Market Jurisdictions Out in the Cold, TAX
NOTES INT’L (Jan. 13, 2020), https://www.taxnotes.com/tax-notes-international/base-erosion-and-profitshifting-beps/oecd-unified-approach-leaves-market-jurisdictions-out-cold/2020/01/13/2bqdn.
145. OECD, UNIFIED APPROACH, supra note 125, at 8.
146. Parker, supra note 141; Elodie Lamer & Sarah Paez, U.S. Withdrawal from Digital Talks Marks
‘Collective Failure’, TAX NOTES TODAY FED. (June 19, 2020), https://www.taxnotes.com/tax-notes-todayfederal/digital-economy/us-withdrawal-digital-talks-marks-collective-failure/2020/06/19/2cmwb; Rochelle
Toplensky, How Trump’s Tariff Threats Are Hustling Global Tax Reform, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 3, 2020),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/how-trumps-tariff-threats-are-hustling-global-tax-reform-11580726125.
147. See Maximilian Frank, OECD Digital Tax Negotiations Thread the Sovereignty Needle, COUNCIL ON
FOREIGN REL. (May 20, 2020), https://www.cfr.org/blog/oecd-digital-tax-negotiations-thread-sovereigntyneedle.
148. Parker & Buell, supra note 100.
149. Natalie Olivo, UK Digital Tax May Outlive Global Agreement, LAW 360 (July 25, 2019), https://www.
law360.com/tax-authority/articles/1179756; Isabel Gottlieb, More Unilateral Taxes Likely if OECD Talks Fail:
German Official, BLOOMBERG TAX (Feb. 3, 2020), https://news.bloombergtax.com/daily-tax-reportinternational/more-unilateral-taxes-likely-if-oecd-talks-fail-german-official; Parker & Buell, supra note 100.
150. KPMG, supra note 73, at 6–12.
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tax rules cannot. However, because of such departure from the conventional
global norm of taxing profits of multinational enterprises in the income tax
framework, DSTs are subject to criticism discussed in Part II.B. Some
opponents aggressively try to understand DSTs as a disguised income tax
despite what positive law provides as a consumption turnover tax. While these
critiques contain merit and need to be addressed, the DST debate could be
viewed differently when viewing DSTs as a consumption tax, which has never
been discussed seriously before. This Article seeks to do so, which could bring
a new life to the DST as a way of taxing the digital economy.
A. Key Features of DSTs in Positive Law
This Subpart observes how positive law offers DSTs. The doctrinal analysis
of such design, as well as criticisms of DSTs, continues to Part II.B.
1. Turnover Tax and Consumption Tax
DSTs are all designed as turnover taxes. In the most general sense, a
turnover tax is defined as “a tax levied on the value of the sales revenue of a
firm”151 rather than other commonly used tax bases such as corporate profits
or sales price. 152 Likewise, DSTs are imposed on the “gross revenue” of
specific digital business models where revenues are linked to the participation
of the business’s local users. 153 Some commentators interpret DSTs as a
disguised income tax,154 but this Article observes what positive law provides
and analyzes DSTs as a turnover tax.
A turnover tax is a subcategory of a consumption tax.155 A consumption
tax refers to a taxing system where taxpayers are taxed based on how much they

151. Turnover Tax, ROUTLEDGE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS (3d ed. 2013).
152. See LOWRY, supra note 71, at 9 (providing that DSTs are “not structured as [a tax] on corporate
profits”); Feng Wei & Jean-François Wen, The Optimal Turnover Threshold and Tax Rate for SMEs 3 (Int’l
Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. 19/98, 2019). In accounting, turnover means the net sales amount by a
business before deducting any expenses, whereas “profit is the residual earnings of a business after all
expenses have been charged against net sales.” Steven Bragg, The Difference Between Turnover and Profit,
ACCOUNTINGTOOLS (Nov. 10, 2019), https://www.accountingtools.com/articles/what-is-the-differencebetween-turnover-and-profit.html.
153. See LOWRY, supra note 71, at 9, 24; see also Bragg, supra note 152. Turnover taxes are essentially one
type of “indirect tax on private consumptive expenditures.” Robert F. Van Brederode, A Normative Evaluation
of Consumption Tax Design: The Treatment of the Sales of Goods Under VAT in the European Union and Sales Tax in
the U.S., 62 TAX L AW. 1055, 1056 (2009). If not explicitly a turnover tax, DSTs may also be considered an
excise tax, which consists of “narrowly based taxes on consumption, levied on specific goods, services, and
activities.” Brookings Inst., Briefing Book, TAX POL’Y CTR., https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/briefingbook/what-are-major-federal-excise-taxes-and-how-much-money-do-they-raise (last visited Feb. 16, 2020).
154. See infra Part II.B.2.
155. HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTEIN, supra note 17, at 649 (including the turnover tax as part of a list
of consumption taxes including retail sales tax, use tax, excise tax, and gross income tax).
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consume rather than how much they earn—income tax.156 Consumption taxes
can take the form of turnover taxes, tariffs, excise taxes, and other taxes on
consumed goods and services. 157 The amount of consumption matches the
sales revenue of a firm, so a turnover tax that is levied on the sales revenue of
a firm falls under the category of a consumption tax.
Turnover taxes have existed for over a century, but they have recently
become a topic of tax policy scholarship as countries have enacted or proposed
DSTs as turnover taxes.158 Turnover taxes have been criticized in part simply
because they “are not based on profits, measures of income, or any other
indicator of consumption power that is targeted by most other tax instruments
in modern developed economies.”159 Moreover, turnover taxes, in general, may
be distortionary due to so-called “tax cascading”—that is, when multiple firms
touch in the development of a product, “the total tax paid will be higher for
goods which pass through several firms to their final sale than for those which
do not.”160 However, turnover taxes have a broad tax base and thus can bring
a “large, stable source of revenue.” 161 Furthermore, turnover taxes offer
simplified compliance for taxpayers because gross sales or revenue are
“relatively easier to measure, record, and verify than profit.” 162 Thus, turnover
taxes have traditionally been used in the taxation of small and medium-sized
enterprises in developing nations.163 The pros and cons of using turnover tax
for taxing the digital economy will be discussed further in Part II.C.2.

156. Jane L. Seigendall, A Framework on Consumption Taxes and Their Impact on International Trade, 18 DICK .
J. INT’L L. 575, 576 (2000).
157. See HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTEIN, supra note 17, at 649.
158 . PwC, ECONOMIC AND POLICY ASPECTS OF DIGITAL SERVICES TURNOVER TAXES: A
LITERATURE REVIEW 1 (2018); see Meyer D. Rothschild, The Gross Sales, or Turnover Tax, 13 NAT’L TAX ASS’N
180, 196–204 (1920) (discussing, in part, the place of a one percent turnover tax within the U.S.’s taxation
scheme around 1920); see JOHN F. DUE, INDIRECT TAXATION IN DEVELOPING ECONOMIES 105–06 (rev.
ed. 1988) (describing the modern use of the turnover tax as beginning in the Philippines with a low-rate tax
on all transactions).
159 . Justin Ross, Gross Receipts Taxes: Theory and Recent Evidence, TAX FOUND. (Oct. 6, 2016),
https://taxfoundation.org/gross-receipts-taxes-theory-and-recent-evidence.
160. Turnover Tax, supra note 151. This tax cascading may result in further negative consequences to
companies operating at a loss or with a thin margin. J OYCE BEEBE, BAKER INST., RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
ON THE E.U.’S DIGITAL TAX PROPOSAL 4 (Jan. 9, 2019).
161 . Garrett Watson, Resisting the Allure of Gross Receipts Taxes: An Assessment of Their Costs and
Consequences, TAX FOUND. (Feb. 6, 2019), https://taxfoundation.org/gross-receipts-tax.
162. See Wei & Wen, supra note 152, at 3.
163. PWC, NEW TURNOVER TAX INTRODUCED FROM JANUARY 2013 1 (2013). Therefore, developing
nations, such as Armenia, introduced turnover taxes as an option to some small- and medium-sized
enterprises. Id. at 2.
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2. Tax Rates and Revenue Threshold
DSTs’ tax rates are set around 2%–7.5%, and they offer revenue threshold
requirements. 164 In other words, a firm’s global revenue from in-scope
business models discussed in Part II.A.4 should exceed certain threshold
amounts to trigger a DST. DSTs also offer a smaller local revenue threshold.
The French DST requires €750 million of global revenue and €25 million of
local revenue, and the U.K. DST requires £500 million of global revenue and
£25 million of local revenue for threshold amounts.165
Countries explain that the rationale for revenue threshold requirements is
to target tech giants that enjoy monopoly power and yet do not pay enough tax
in the market countries. 166 Furthermore, the local revenue threshold is to
recognize a firm’s tax nexus to the market countries regardless of its physical
presence—explained in Part II.A.3.167 If a firm generates revenue more than
the threshold amount in the market country where users are located, it is
enough to recognize the tax nexus to the market countries, and thus, market
countries should be able to exercise taxing rights on the firm. These
requirements are also upheld in Wayfair, although the tax at issue in the case is
the sales tax collection obligation of remote sellers, not a turnover tax liability
imposed on the platforms. 168
The revenue threshold requirements are criticized mainly for two reasons.
First, they do not offer safe harbors for businesses in losses. 169 Many digital
firms would suffer from losses, especially in their early stage of business, but
they might be subject to DSTs as long as they generate large amounts of gross
revenue. To ameliorate this problem, for example, the U.K. DST proposal
exempts the first ₤25 million in taxable U.K. revenues and provides a 0% tax
rate for companies making losses.170 Second, critics suspect that only American
tech giants might satisfy the revenue threshold requirements and be subject to
DSTs. This critique will be discussed in Part II.B in detail.

164. See Initiation of Section 301 Investigations of Digital Services Taxes, 85 Fed. Reg. 34,709, 34,709–
10 (June 5, 2020).
165. France: Digital Services Tax (3%) is Enacted, KPMG (July 25, 2019), https://home.kpmg/us/en/
home/insights/2019/07/tnf-france-digital-services-tax-enacted.html.
166. Id. (“Tech companies allegedly have realized benefits from an undue advantage . . . .”); HM
TREASURY & HM REVENUE & CUSTOMS, DIGITAL SERVICES TAX: CONSULTATION 22 (2018) (“The
thresholds are also based on an expectation that the value derived from users will be more material for large
digital businesses . . . .”); EU Digital Services Tax Proposal 2018, supra note 18, at 10 (supporting a global revenue
threshold to limit application of tax to “companies of a certain scale, which are those which have established
strong market positions that allow them to benefit relatively more from network effects and exploitation of
big data”).
167. EU Digital Services Tax Proposal 2018, supra note 18, at 10–11.
168. South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2099 (2018).
169. See Bunn, supra note 20 (“The tax would still apply even if those companies were not profitable,
ignoring the costs associated with the revenues.”).
170. Bunn, supra note 77.
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3. New Rules for Tax Nexus and Profit Allocation
As to the mechanics of recognizing tax nexus and allocating profits of
digital firms, DSTs reject both the traditional requirement of physical presence
and arm’s length principle in income taxation. More precisely, they do not have
to be bound by such requirements because they are turnover consumption
taxes.
In a traditional income tax framework, when a firm located in Country A
sells goods or services in Country B (market country), profits of the firm may
be allocated to, and subject to income tax in, Country B only if the firm has a
tax nexus in Country B. The most notable form of the tax nexus is the firm’s
physical presence, such as a subsidiary and a permanent establishment in
Country B. Once the tax nexus is recognized, the physical presence is
considered a related party of the firm, and the global profits of the firm are
allocated between Countries A and B based on the arm’s length principle. That
is, the amount charged by one related party to another for a given product or
service must be the same as if the parties were not related. The so-determined
amount of profits is allocated to Country B and subject to Country B’s tax
jurisdiction. The limitations of the traditional approach pertaining to the digital
economy is that there is no way for Country B to collect revenue from a firm’s
remote business if the firm does not establish a physical presence there.
DSTs would, in effect, modify such tax nexus and profit allocation rules in
income tax because they require allocating profits to market countries where
users are located, irrespective of whether the businesses have a local physical
presence. First, DSTs do not require a physical presence to recognize a tax
nexus in market jurisdictions. Instead, they recognize a tax nexus if, for
example, the revenue amount generated in market countries exceeds certain
thresholds. The number of users or transactions occurring in the market
country is also a criterion to consider, which replaces the traditional physical
presence in income tax. Second, once the tax nexus is recognized, an amount
of profit should be allocated to market jurisdictions in which relevant
businesses’ active and participatory user bases are located, even if there is no
local physical presence. As a result, market countries would be able to collect
revenue from the digital economy, which was not possible under the traditional
rules.
4. Limited Scope
One of the most notable features of DSTs is their limited scope. A DST is
designed to apply to the identified digital business models where tax challenges

22D53F6F -1778-4E8E-8A93-DA0F 31B227E7 .DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

11/16/2020 3:03 PM

2020] Digital Services Tax: A Cross-Border Variation of the Consumption Tax Debate

163

are primarily manifest with mobile IPs and significant user participation. 171 As
a result, it “ring-fences,” or segregates, such specified digital business models
from the rest of the digital economy. 172 To illustrate, the scope of the U.K.
DST is limited to search engines, social media platforms, and online
marketplaces but excludes certain regulated financial and payment services, the
provision of online content, sales of software/hardware, and television or
broadcasting services. Thus, Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, Google, Amazon
Marketplace, Kayak, Priceline, Uber, and Airbnb are in scope, whereas PayPal,
Netflix, Hulu, Spotify, and Ubisoft are excluded.173
However, there are certain digital platforms that need further clarification
on whether they should be within the scope of DSTs. For example, it is still
puzzling whether LinkedIn or YouTube are considered social media platforms
subject to a DST or digital interfaces providing digital content and thus not
subject to a DST. Also, Spotify and Netflix are currently not subject to a DST—
except in Turkey—but they raise another line-drawing question when they offer
customized advertising services to their users. The scope of DSTs concerning
the ring-fencing problem will be further discussed in Part III.C.3.
B. Criticisms of DSTs
While DSTs offer benefits, they cannot escape criticism from stakeholders.
Digital firms have bluntly expressed their unhappiness with this new tax.174 The
U.S. government also shares the same concerns held by many tech giants
located in the U.S.175 On the other hand, academic literature is divided: some
scholars take a critical stance towards DSTs, while others are more
sympathetic.176 Based on the key features discussed above, let us now examine
the criticisms facing DSTs.

171. EU Digital Services Tax Proposal 2018, supra note 18, at 7–12 (“DST is a tax with a targeted scope,
levied on the revenues resulting from the supply of certain digital services characterised by user value
creation.”); HM TREASURY & HM REVENUE & CUSTOMS, supra note 166, at 6 (explaining that the DST is
“designed to ensure digital businesses pay tax reflecting the value they derive from the participation of UK
users” and simultaneously dealing with “the international tax framework’s failure to recognise this important
source of value creation”).
172. OECD, ADDRESSING THE TAX CHALLENGES OF THE DIGITAL ECONOMY 12 (2014) (warning
that the digital economy “would be difficult, if not impossible, to ring-fence” by “[a]ttempting to isolate [it]
as a separate sector”).
173. Cui, supra note 4, at 6.
174. See Kanter, supra note 21 (including statements and actions from representatives from Amazon,
Facebook, and Google decrying the French DST as unfair or harmful).
175. Press Release, USTR Announces Initiation of Section 301 Investigation into France’s Digital
Services Tax, OFF. U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE (July 10, 2019) (available at https://ustr.gov/aboutus/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2019/july/ustr-announces-initiation-section-301) (“The U.S.
is very concerned that the digital services tax which is expected to pass the French Senate tomorrow unfairly
targets American companies . . . .”).
176. For the former position, see Bauer, supra note 29; Jessop, supra note 29; Johannes Becker &
Joachim Englisch, EU Digital Services Tax: A Populist and Flawed Proposal, KLUWER INT’L TAX BLOG (Mar. 16,
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1. Ring-Fencing and Discrimination
First, because DSTs only apply to the specific digital business models, it
has been criticized as ring-fencing, or segregating, the identified digital business
models where tax challenges are primarily manifest with mobile IP and
significant user participation. The proponents of other income-tax-based
proposals argue that DSTs go against the idea of a level playing field by
penalizing the big or early players in the market.177
Second, various unilateral DSTs potentially discriminate against businesses
based on nationality.178 It has been deeply suspected that the revenue threshold
would only be satisfied by American tech giants. On this point of the challenge,
the U.S. has been a major opponent to the general concept of a DST. In a letter
dated January 29, 2019, from Senators Grassley and Wyden to U.S. Treasury
Secretary Mnuchin, copying EC and European Council, the Senators expressed
concern about unilateral DSTs because they are “designed to discriminate
against U.S.-based multinational companies.” 179 In March 2019, Treasury
Department Assistant Secretary for International Tax Affairs, Chip Harter,
expressed concerns that under the WTO, trade agreements, and treaties, the
French DST proposal could be challenged as discriminatory vis-à-vis U.S.
companies and stated that the U.S. is opposed to any digital services tax
proposals.180 In December 2019, after a study in which it concluded that the
French DST violated section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 as a discriminatory
tax, the U.S. Trade Representative proposed tariffs of up to 100% on certain
French imports to discourage the French DST. 181 In response, France, in
concert with the EU, contemplated the counteractive trade sanctions against
the U.S.182 The tension seemed to be relaxed while the G20/OECD countries
agreed to wait for the global deal by the end of 2020,183 but in July 2020, the
U.S. government declared that it would impose additional duties of 25% on

2018), kluwertaxblog.com/2018/03/16/eu-digital-services-tax-populist-flawed-proposal/?print=pdf. For
the latter position, see, for example, Cui, supra note 4; Daniel Shaviro, Digital Services Taxes and the Broader Shift
from Determining the Source of Income to Taxing Location-Specific Rents 5 (N.Y.U L. & Econ., Research Paper No.
19-36, 2019) (stating that DSTs “have promise, not just in themselves, but as a model for broader rethinking
of international tax policy”).
177. See Bunn, supra note 20.
178. See supra note 21 accompanying text.
179. Letter from Charles E. Grassley & Ron Wyden, U.S. Senators, U.S. Senate Comm. on Fin., to
Steven T. Mnuchin, Sec’y, Dep’t U.S. Treasury (Jan. 29, 2019) (available at https://www.finance.senate.gov/
imo/media/doc/2019-01-29%20CEG,%20Wyden%20to%20Treasury%20(Foreign%20Digital%20Services
%20Taxes-OECD).pdf).
180. Leigh Thomas & Francesco Guarascio, U.S. Sees Unilateral Taxes on Web Giants as ‘Discriminatory’:
Treasury Official, REUTERS (Mar. 12, 2019), https://reuters.com/article/us-usa-tax-harter-idUSKBN1QT1
CT.
181. Parker, supra note 13.
182. Keohane et al., supra note 99.
183. Parker & Buell, supra note 100.
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French luxuries.184 In addition, the U.S. government announced investigations
of several other governments that have adopted or are considering DSTs,
including the EU, U.K., Italy, Spain, Indonesia, Brazil, Turkey, and India.185 So,
it is plausible that the DST debate would escalate to a trans-Atlantic, and even
global, trade war.
The two criticisms above raise fair concerns that need to be addressed.
Implementing a tax that harms the growth of new business and
disproportionately impacts certain companies based on nationality is neither
efficient nor fair. 186 However, it is essentially an empirical question that
requires evidence on whether the majority of the companies subject to a DST
are foreign multinationals from market jurisdictions; yet, no such data is
available. Furthermore, the criticism is largely based on practical concerns and
focused on the imminent impact, such as who is the winner and loser in the
short term, that can be improved in the implementation stage. Part III proposes
possible alternatives to improve DSTs on these points.
2. Disguised Income Tax
Third, some commentators argue that it is possible to interpret DSTs as a
disguised direct tax, or corporate income tax. Such interpretation may result in
a double taxation problem and violations of tax treaties in international tax.187
The first two criticisms above contain little discussion of the consumption tax
aspect of DSTs, although the positive law clearly provides DSTs as a turnover
tax and a consumption tax.188 In this regard, the third criticism offers important
doctrinal implications.
The attempt to interpret DSTs as income tax is largely based on the idea
that the current design of DSTs “depart[s] from traditional income or turnover
taxes.”189 The critics argue that, if the goal of such unconventional DSTs is to
make up the foregone revenue from traditional income tax system, the
184. Notice of Action in the Section 301 Investigations of France’s Digital Services Tax, 85 Fed. Reg.
43,292, 43,292-97 (July 16, 2020).
185. Initiation of Section 301 Investigations of Digital Services Taxes, 85 Fed. Reg. 34,709, 34,711–14
(June 5, 2020).
186. Bunn, supra note 20; Mason & Parada, supra note 21, at 1197 (“[W]e argue[] that revenue thresholds
in current digital tax proposals are vulnerable to nationality discrimination claims because they are intended
to – and as applied by individual member states, likely would – burden mostly nonresident companies.”).
187. See, e.g., Ismer & Jescheck, supra note 22, at 577; EU Digital Services Tax Proposal 2018, supra note
18.
188. Lack of analysis on the consumption tax aspect of a DST is largely due to the EU’s single
consumption tax policy, where only one type of consumption tax—i.e., VAT—may exist in the EU. Council
Directive 347/65, art. 401, 2006 O.J. (L 347) (EC). Thus, policy papers in the EU often explain that a DST
is a lumpsum tax to compensate a loss of corporate tax revenue. See, e.g., EU Digital Services Tax Proposal 2018,
supra note 18, at 10. However, such EU policy for single consumption tax cannot prevent the scholars from
constructing DSTs as a consumption tax, both doctrinally and normatively.
189. Ismer & Jescheck, supra note 22, at 577. Furthermore, the U.K. DST is effectively exempted for
companies making losses. See supra text accompanying note 77.
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legislature may infer that DSTs relate to “profits” of tech giants,190 which are
the tax base of income tax. 191 The fact that the technical tax base is gross
revenues does not necessarily negate the suspicion of income taxation because
other direct taxes, such as withholding tax as a collection mechanism of income
tax, are also levied on gross profits.192 The taxable period of DSTs is also on a
yearly basis, rather than on a per-transaction basis, which is more similar to
direct taxation than indirect taxation.
Interpreting DSTs as income tax has important implications in
international tax, because it may cause double taxation and violations of tax
treaties.193 Double taxation on certain income may occur when two or more
countries concurrently contribute to that income. One country might
contribute to the income as a residence country of a taxpayer, and another
country might contribute to the same income as a source country where the
taxpayer deploys investment. However, if the two countries claim to collect tax
on the same income, double taxation occurs. Thus, countries enter into income
tax treaties with their major trading partners to eliminate such a double taxation
problem. 194 When a state exercises primary taxing rights on certain income
based on the rule set by an income tax treaty, the other contracting state should
concede to the first state’s taxing rights and exercise residual taxing rights or
offer measures to eliminate double taxation on the same income, such as
foreign tax credits or exemptions from taxes.195
Putting the double taxation problem in the DST debate, a digital firm’s
profits, including those generated from market countries, have been subject to
corporate income tax in the firm’s residence country. Now, however, market
countries are introducing a DST on the firm’s gross revenue generated from
the market country. From the firm’s perspective, it now faces two different
taxes to two different countries respectively.196
However, the double taxation problem does not occur if two taxes are
imposed on different tax bases. For example, many countries impose VAT on
190. Ismer & Jescheck, supra note 22, at 575.
191. Income tax is classified as a direct tax, whereas a turnover tax is classified as an indirect tax. See
Henry Ordower, Horizontal and Vertical Equity in Taxation as Constitutional Principles: Germany and the U.S.
Contrasted, 7 FLA. TAX REV. 259, 267–68 (2006).
192. Withholding tax is a tax levied on income, such as wages and certain income of nonresident aliens,
that a payor withholds from the payment and pays directly to the government. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 1441, 3402.
For example, “fixed or determinable annual or periodical” income of nonresident aliens is usually subject to
a 30% withholding tax on the gross amount paid. Harvey P. Dale, Withholding Tax on Payments to Foreign Persons,
36 TAX L. REV. 49, 59 (1980).
193. If a DST is a direct tax, there is a risk that the DST is within the scope of “Taxes Covered” in
Article 2 of the OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital. Such risk leads to the treaty-level
concern of double taxation. OECD MODEL, supra note 3, at 28.
194. See, e.g., U.S. MODEL, supra note 2, at 1 (“The Government of the United States of America and
the Government of __, intending to conclude a Convention for the elimination of double taxation with
respect to taxes on income . . . .”).
195. Rebecca M. Kysar, Interpreting Tax Treaties, 101 IOWA L. REV. 1387, 1393–94 (2016).
196. Ismer & Jescheck, supra note 22, at 574.
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a business’s consumption, or gross margin, and at the same time they impose
corporate income tax on the business’s net income.197 Although the tax base
of VAT and that of corporate income tax are not exactly the same, they may
significantly overlap. However, this approach is not double taxation, because
VAT is imposed on taxpayer’s consumption whereas corporate income tax is
imposed on the taxpayer’s net income. The same explanation should hold for
DSTs. The positive law clearly states that the tax base of DSTs is gross revenue
of certain digital firms. This is different from the tax base of income tax, which
is net income after deducting expenses from gross revenue. Thus, accusing
DSTs of creating a double taxation problem should not be a legitimate concern
as long as DSTs are interpreted as a turnover tax.198
Furthermore, interpreting DSTs as income tax may not always promote the
national interest of the U.S. American tech giants have complained about their
increased overall tax liability due to new DSTs because both market countries
and home countries of tech giants can impose tax on such tech giants by
bypassing the double tax issues—the former imposes a turnover tax, and the
latter imposes income tax. On the other hand, if DSTs are interpreted as
disguised income tax, it results in double taxation, which must be avoided as
per the mandate by income tax treaties. A plausible solution would be for home
countries, or residence countries, of the firms to allow a foreign tax credit for
such DSTs paid to market countries, or source countries.199 In the DST debate,
the American digital firms would claim foreign tax credit against the corporate
tax liability payable to the U.S. government. In other words, interpreting DSTs
as income tax might decrease American tech giants’ worldwide tax liability, but
it may open a possibility to reduce the U.S. tax revenue.200

197. Id. at 576. For example, a toy manufacturer is located in a country having a 10% VAT and 20%
corporate income tax. The toy manufacturer buys the raw materials for $4.00, plus a VAT of $0.40—payable
to the government—for a total price of $4.40. The manufacturer then sells the toy to a retailer for $10.00
plus a VAT of $1.00 for a total of $11.00. However, the manufacturer renders only sixty cents to the
government, which is the total VAT at this point, minus the prior VAT charged by the raw material
supplier. Note that the sixty cents also equals 10% of the manufacturer’s gross margin of $6.00. In addition,
the toy manufacturer should pay corporate income tax on its net income of $6.00, which is the gross revenue
of $10.00 minus deductible expenses for the raw materials of $4.00, at 20% corporate income tax rate, which
is a total of $12.00 corporate income tax. This example shows that the tax base of VAT and corporate income
tax may significantly overlap, but it is still not considered double taxation.
198. Ismer & Jescheck, supra note 22, at 575, 577 (conceding that the DST enacted as either a Member
State tax or “a real ‘EU tax’” would bring the DST outside the scope of taxes covered by income tax treaties
while still maintaining that it is unclear how the court would classify DSTs).
199. The U.K. DST proposal recognizes this potential foreign tax credit issue and provides that if the
DST will not be within the scope of the U.K.’s double tax treaties, it will not be creditable against the U.K.
Corporation Tax. HM TREASURY & HM REVENUE & CUSTOMS, supra note 166, at 29, 32.
200. Even if DSTs are interpreted as income tax, it might be challenging for tech giants to successfully
claim foreign tax credit for DSTs due to complicated requirements for foreign tax credit. However, it is
noteworthy that recent opinions of the Advocates General regarding Hungarian DSTs consistently hold that
the Hungarian DST constitutes a turnover-based special income tax in order to bypass the single
consumption tax policy of the EU, discussed supra note 188. See Case C-323/18, Tesco-Global Áruházak Zrt.
v. Nemzeti Adó- és Vámhivatal Fellebbviteli Igazgatósága, 2019 E.C.R. 567; Case C-75/18, Vodafone
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The issue of doctrinal interpretation of DSTs as income tax or
consumption tax might have implications on the potential trade war. If a DST
is considered as income tax rather than a turnover-based consumption tax, it
could fall under the Direct Tax Exception in art. XIV of the General Agreement
on Tariffs in Services (GATS).201 The detailed analysis of the GATS’ direct tax
exception is beyond the scope of this Article, but some might find it more
beneficial to interpret DSTs as a consumption tax if they would like to hold the
cards that could be used in a potential trade law dispute.
As discussed above, the attempt to doctrinally interpret DSTs as income
tax is arguably based on its unconventionality. However, it is not fully
convincing why DSTs should be interpreted as income tax simply because it is
unconventional, notwithstanding that positive law clearly designs it as a
turnover tax. What is unconventional is the new digital economy that gives birth
to DSTs; the design of DSTs themselves is a conventional turnover-based
consumption tax. The tax base of DSTs is clearly different from that of income
tax, and it is well-established that significant overlap of tax base between
consumption tax and income tax is not considered double taxation. Perhaps a
blunt motivation for this doctrinal analysis would be the global revenue
competition by states who cannot easily ignore the complaint of tech giants for
the increased tax burden. However, the above discussion infers that interpreting
DSTs as income tax might not serve the best interest of the home countries of
such tech giants that are arguably losing in the revenue competition.
Then, the discussion develops into the next phase: normatively, should we
construct DSTs as income tax? Put more generally, is an income-tax-based
solution better than a consumption-tax-based solution? If the answer would be
negative, what are the benefits of constructing DSTs as a consumption tax? Part
II.C deals with such normative discussion that has been neglected in the DST
debate.

Magyarország Mobil Távközlési Zrt. v. Nemzeti Adó- és Vámhivatal Fellebbviteli Igazgatósága, 2020 E.C.R.
139; Case-C482/18, Google Ir. Ltd. v. Nemzeti Adó- és Vámhivatal Fellebbviteli Igazgatósága, 2019 E.C.R.
728. The opinions of the Advocates General are advisory and do not bind the court, but they are nonetheless
very influential and are followed in the majority of cases, as shown in the Tesco-Global case and the Vodafone
case. For detailed analysis of these cases, see Mason & Parada, supra note 12, at 24–36. If that is the case, it
would be wise for the U.S. government to consider the foreign tax credit issue more seriously.
201. General Agreement on Trade in Services art. XIV(d), Apr. 15, 1994, 1869 U.N.T.S. 194–96
[hereinafter GATS]; Andrew D Mitchell et al., Taxing Tech: Risks of an Australian Digital Services Tax Under
International Economic Law, 20 MELB. J. INT’L L. 88, 105 (2019); PwC, A WHITE PAPER ANALYZING THE EU’S
2018 PROPOSED DIGITAL SERVICES TAX (INTERIM MEASURE) UNDER WTO LAW 14–15 (2019). The
definition of direct taxes under the GATS encompasses “all taxes on total income, on total capital or on
elements of income or of capital, including taxes on gains from the alienation of property, taxes on estates,
inheritances and gifts, and taxes on the total amounts of wages or salaries paid by enterprises, as well as taxes
on capital appreciation.” GATS, supra at 201.
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C. Should We Stick to Income-Tax-Based Solutions?
DSTs have been gaining more political impetus in many countries as a
solution for the tax challenges in the digital economy, becoming the new status
quo.202 They are designed as turnover taxes imposed on gross revenue, and
therefore, by definition, they are subcategories of consumption tax. On the
other hand, there are still ongoing efforts to propose a global solution based on
the traditional income tax framework, either by modifying current income tax
rules or by interpreting DSTs as income tax.203 Such DST debate recalls the
traditional debate on the normative superiority between consumption tax and
income tax. But the DST debate shows variation from the old debate between
consumption tax and income tax as it relates to a cross-border taxation in the
digital era, while the old debate largely focuses on domestic taxation. This
Subpart gives an overview of the old debate between consumption tax and
income tax and offers a new perspective on the DST debate: a
consumption-tax-based DST can be a suitable tax policy to solve tax challenges
of the digital economy if the concerns in the existing design are mitigated.
1. Old Debate: Consumption Tax vs. Income Tax
A consumption tax is a tax on the purchase of goods or services.204 In a
broader sense, consumption tax refers to a taxing system where people are taxed
based on how much they consume rather than how much they add to the
economy, such as under an income tax. 205 Examples of a consumption tax
include retail sales taxes, excise taxes, value added taxes, use taxes, import
duties, and most importantly for this paper, turnover taxes or taxes on gross
business receipts.206
Consumption taxes are generally borne by consumers because vendors
charge a higher price for the good or service to account for the amount of
consumption tax.207 The vendor then remits the tax to the appropriate federal,
state, or local government.

202. See supra Part I.C.
203. See supra Parts I.D and II.B.2.
204. Anne L. Alstott, The Uneasy Liberal Case Against Income and Wealth Transfer Taxation: A Response to
Professor McCaffery, 51 TAX L. REV. 363, 364 (1996) (“A consumption tax, by definition, taxes only income
spent on current, personal consumption (for example, on cars, food and travel).”).
205. See Alvin Warren, Would a Consumption Tax Be Fairer Than an Income Tax?, 89 YALE L.J. 1081, 1083–
84 (1980) (citing generally HENRY C. SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION 59–102 (1938)).
206. HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTEIN, supra note 17, at 649 (including the turnover tax as part of a list
of consumption taxes including retail sales tax, use tax, excise tax, and gross income tax).
207. This concept is called “tax incidence.” See infra Part III.A.1; see also Who Bears the Burden of a National
Retail Sales Tax?, TAX POL’Y CTR., https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/briefing-book/who-bears-burdennational-retail-sales-tax (last updated May 2020).
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Proponents of a consumption tax argue that it encourages saving and
investment, which makes the economy more efficient, whereas an income tax
penalizes savers and rewards spenders.208 Thus, they argue that it is fairer to
tax those who take out of the limited resource pool through consumption,
rather than to tax what they contribute to the pool using their income. On the
other hand, opponents argue that a consumption tax adversely affects the poor
who, by necessity, spend a higher percentage of their income. 209 Because
consumption tax is a form of regressive tax, wealthy households consume a
smaller fraction of their income than poorer households do.210 On the other
hand, the income tax is justified as more progressive due to the ability to pay
being determined through levels of income.211
Overall, consumption tax has strength in efficiency and administrability,
whereas income tax has merits in equity. In terms of efficiency, an income tax
effectively reduces the value of future consumption relative to present
consumption by discriminating against savings, creating a deadweight loss.212
On the other hand, a consumption tax improves efficiency by treating savings
at a more neutral standpoint, allowing for “greater individual savings and
investment, capital formation, and ultimately greater economic productivity.”213
As for administrability, the strength of the consumption tax in modern tax
dialogue can be more readily seen from the reduced complexity that would
occur in replacing an income tax with a consumption tax.214 Proponents of the
consumption tax point to the complexity of income taxes in inconsistently
treating certain categories of income, such as the different tax treatment
between savings from ordinary income and increases in wealth through
appreciation.215
In international tax, scholars place greater focus on efficiency and
administrability than on equity or fairness.216 International tax literature has
been described as having a “narrow normative focus,” which is “guided by
worldwide economic efficiency . . . concerned with increasing economic output

208. Martin A. Sullivan, Introduction: Getting Acquainted with VAT, in THE VAT READER 12 (2011).
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. See Daniel S. Goldberg, The U.S. Consumption Tax: Evolution, Not Revolution, 57 TAX LAW. 1 (2003);
see also Warren, supra note 205, at 1092–93.
212. William D. Andrews, A Consumption-Type or Cash Flow Personal Income Tax, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1113,
1113–14 (1974).
213. Goldberg, supra note 211, at 21.
214. See CHRIS R. EDWARDS, CATO INST., SIMPLIFYING FEDERAL TAXES: THE ADVANTAGES OF
CONSUMPTION-BASED TAXATION 16 (2001) (providing a detailed list of income tax complexities that could
be eliminated in implementing a consumption tax).
215. Andrews, supra note 212, at 1115.
216. See, e.g., David L. Forst, The U.S. International Tax Treatment of Partnerships: A Policy-Based Approach,
14 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 239, 250 (1996) (“[E]quity has more recently been considered as ‘irrelevant’ to
contemporary international tax policy, and the more recent literature primarily focuses on economic
principles.” (footnote omitted)).
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and reducing deadweight loss, wherever it occurs.”217 In contrast, domestic tax,
especially personal income tax, tends to focus more heavily on concerns over
equity and fairness.218 Relying on international concerns of taxation focused
more heavily on economic principles, especially efficiency, the consumption tax
is likely to have an advantage over income tax in addressing efficient
deployment of global capital of multinational enterprises. This insight may
apply to the new debate on DSTs discussed below.
2. New Debate: DSTs vs. Income-Tax-Based Proposals
The DST discussion largely occurs in cross-border business transactions.
In international tax and business tax, the three traditional policy prongs—
namely efficiency, equity, and administrability—are not equally important.
International tax and business tax emphasize efficiency and administrability
more than equity. Thus, applying this weighted policy criterion may be
appropriate for analyzing international taxation responses to digitalization.
Considering that the strength of consumption tax is efficiency and
administrability and the strength of income tax is equity,
consumption-tax-driven proposals may be normatively superior, at least for
cross-border digitalization of the economy.
Noticing the possible advantage of consumption tax in cross-border
business transactions, this Article proposes an alternative approach to validate
DSTs by envisaging them as a cross-border consumption tax, which offers the
following merits.
First, there is no need to make efforts to undertake the fundamental
overhaul of nexus and allocation rules to reward more taxing rights if the goal
of the DST debate is to reward market jurisdictions. A consumption tax is by
nature imposed in the place where the consumption occurs; in the highly
digitalized business model, it is the market jurisdictions where users are located.
Thus, a consumption-tax-based DST can be successful in rewarding market
countries. Furthermore, the DST as a turnover tax is meant to make up for the
inapplicability of traditional income tax rules that were mainly created for
brick-and-mortar businesses and relied on physical presence. This is a very
important justification for the EU using the turnover tax to deal with aggressive
tax planning from digital companies by subjecting them to tax that can be
implemented without following traditional tax laws.219
Second, a solid construction of a DST as a consumption tax may easily
eliminate the double taxation concern in international tax addressed in Part
II.B.2. Interpreting a DST as an income tax and inviting a tax treaty to deal with
217. Graetz, supra note 54, at 276, 280.
218. See id. at 276.
219. EU Digital Services Tax Proposal 2018, supra note 18.
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potential double taxation is not wise, considering that tax treaty is not a good
tool to deal with the tax challenges in the digital economy.220
Third, a DST, as a consumption tax, may be more efficient and
administrable than income-tax-based proposals because a consumption tax is
superior in efficiency and administrability. The tax challenges of the
digitalization of the economy are inevitably related to cross-border transactions
or business taxation, where efficiency and administrability are more important.
DSTs, as a turnover tax, also provide a broad tax base as a “stable source of
revenue” and is simple to administer.221 More interestingly, a DST designed as
a turnover tax may overcome the general criticism on turnover taxes: such taxes
are imposed on gross revenue and thus create economic distortion due to tax
cascading. 222 This tax cascading problem occurs when multiple firms are
involved in the development of a product or supply chain.223 However, highly
digitalized business models subject to a DST involve a single firm or short
supply chain functioning as a platform. Those digital firms implicate almost
zero or negligible marginal cost when they generate revenue. 224 The new
features of the digital economy may mitigate the potential tax cascading
problem associated with turnover taxes.225
Fourth, although a consumption-tax-based approach might not serve
equity or fairness well as compared to income-tax-based proposals, a DST may
overcome the fairness or regressive problem with respect to individual
taxpayers considering that many highly digitalized businesses subject to DSTs
adopt multisided platform models. In a multisided platform model, fees charged
by digital firms are paid by another business, such as user-sellers or advertisers,
and thus, the tax incidence would be on the user-sellers or advertisers, not retail
users.
It is also worth noting that South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc. examines the
economic nexus rule in connection with a “sales tax,” which is an example of a
consumption tax. 226 Until the summer of 2018, because of the traditional
physical presence requirement, remote online sellers did not collect sales tax
from customers located in states where they did not have a physical presence.
However, the Wayfair Court overturned the physical presence rule in favor of

220. Wei Cui, The Superiority of the Digital Services Tax over Significant Digital Presence Proposals, 72 NAT’ L.
TAX J. 839, 840–41 (2019) (weighing the familiarity in using the treaty approach against the disadvantages of
clinging to “superfluous conventions” and discussing the impact the restriction on the treaty framework may
have on international cooperation).
221. Watson, supra note 161.
222. See supra Part II.A.1.
223. Turnover Tax, supra note 151.
224. Cui, supra note 4, at 25–27.
225. See infra Part III.A.
226. See generally Ruth Mason, Implications of Wayfair, 46 INTERTAX 810, 814–19 (2018) (providing the
implications of Wayfair in international tax, with a preference to the general solution over a temporary
solution, such as DSTs).

22D53F6F -1778-4E8E-8A93-DA0F 31B227E7 .DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

11/16/2020 3:03 PM

2020] Digital Services Tax: A Cross-Border Variation of the Consumption Tax Debate

173

an economic presence rule.227 The policy rationale in Wayfair is consistent with
the G20/OECD’s discussion on the new tax nexus rule, which is moving away
from strict physical presence rules. However, the decision itself is not strictly
supportive of income-tax-based proposals because the new tax nexus rule can
be applied in the context of a consumption tax. South Dakota’s sales tax rules
upheld in Wayfair were quite similar to the current design of the DST, besides
the applicable tax rate and the detailed obligation of the remote sellers. 228
Furthermore, the Netflix Tax, adopting an economic nexus rule following
Wayfair, resembles DSTs. As observed in Wayfair, the discussion on the modern
taxation of digitalized business models could apply to a consumption tax, such
as a DST.229
III. HOW TO IMPROVE DSTS AS A CONSUMPTION TAX
Part II critically reviewed the critiques against a DST and argued that
constructing a DST as a consumption tax could bring new life to the DST and
taxation of the digital economy. In order to do so, certain issues need to be
further explored and improved. This Part, among other topics, discusses the tax
incidence of the DST, compares the DST with consumption taxes, and suggests
expanding the scope of businesses subject to the DST to overcome the limited
scope. These novel discussions inspired by DSTs may also offer a new path
toward a consumption tax in international taxation of the digital economy.
A. Tax Incidence of DSTs
The first issue that is prominently understudied in the DST debate is who
bears the economic burden. In tax terms, the question refers to the tax
incidence of a DST. At the early stages of the DST debate, critics argued that
the tax incidence of DSTs would be borne by consumers because of the
turnover tax design and therefore would negatively affect the demand side of
the digital economy.230 However, such criticism is not convincing considering
that many digital business models are multisided. In a multisided business
model, there are two types of users—user-buyers and user-sellers—and the fees
imposed by a service provider are on the user-seller side. Thus, it is not

227. Id. at 814–15.
228. To be precise, remote sellers in Wayfair had the obligation to “collect” sales tax from remote
buyers, whereas digital platforms in DSTs have the obligation to “pay” DSTs as their own tax liability.
229. Id. at 818–19.
230. Bauer, supra note 29; Elizabeth Schulze, France’s Digital Tax Could Hurt Consumers More Than Tech
Companies, CNBC (July 12, 2019), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/07/12/france-digital-tax-could-hurtconsumers-more-than-tech-companies.html.
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conceptually impossible to pass the tax incidence to user-sellers, rather than
user-buyers.231
In fact, since the adoption of the new DST in France and the U.K., Amazon
and Google announced that they consider the DST a consumption tax and will
pass the tax’s cost to user-sellers or user-advertisers in those countries by
increasing various fees. 232 Thus, despite attempts at interpreting DSTs as
disguised income tax, DSTs are applied as a consumption tax in the real
world.233 On the other hand, Facebook and eBay announced that they would
not pass on the new U.K. DST’s cost to user-sellers or user-advertisers in the
U.K.234
Nevertheless, although the European anecdote on tax incidence proves
that market players generally perceive DSTs as a consumption tax and
accordingly consider the option of passing the tax incidence to one type of
users—the user-sellers or user-advertisers—whether such tax incidence is
normatively desirable is another question. Should a DST, constructed as a
turnover tax or consumption tax, logically and conceptually pass the economic
burden of the tax to one side of users? Or, from a policy perspective, can we
design a DST as a consumption tax where the tax incidence is absorbed by
digital platform firms? This question is particularly important because the digital
economy is no longer the simple one-sided market the traditional tax incidence
model has assumed. Furthermore, the digital firms, constructed as multisided
business models and subject to DSTs, are largely monopolistic and thus may
result in a different policy analysis of tax incidence. This Subpart further
explores this issue in relation to traditional and recent studies on the tax
incidence of multisided business models.

231. Cui, supra note 4, at 3.
232. Kanter, supra note 21. Amazon increased a referral fee on French user-sellers by 3% starting
October 1, 2019, to reflect the cost of the French DST. Todd Buell, Amazon Raising Fees on French Sellers After
Digital Tax, LAW 360 (Aug. 1, 2019), https://www.law360.com/articles/1184355/amazon-raising-fees-onfrench-sellers-after-digital-tax. The referral fee is the fee that the company charges vendors for using Amazon
to sell products. Similarly, Amazon will increase user-sellers’ fees on its U.K. site by 2% starting September
1, 2020, although the U.K. DST became law in July 2020, effective on April 1, 2020. Hamza Ali, Amazon
Passes Cost of U.K. Digital Services Tax to Sellers (1), BLOOMBERG TAX (Aug. 4, 2020),
https://news.bloomberglaw.com/daily-tax-report-international/amazon-passes-cost-of-u-k-digital-servicestax-to-sellers?context=search&index=39. Google follows Amazon’s suit and plans to raise user-advertisers’
fees on its platform. Alex Barker, Google to Pass Cost of Digital Services Taxes on to Advertisers, FIN. TIMES (Sep.
1, 2020), https://www.ft.com/content/fda648aa-bb52-4ab2-aa18-46b5023cb893.
233. See supra Part II.B.2.
234. Joseph Boris, EBay Says It Won’t Shift UK Digital Tax Burden to Sellers, LAW360 (Aug. 12, 2020),
https://www.law360.com/articles/1300712/ebay-says-it-won-t-shift-uk-digital-tax-burden-to-sellers; Ali,
supra note 31.
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1. Tax Incidence and Fairness
Consideration of the incidence of a tax is important because it represents
which part of the economy bears the ultimate burden of the tax and can help
policy makers determine the overall progressivity and efficiency of any tax
proposal.235 The incidence of a tax can refer to either the statutory incidence
or the economic incidence. The statutory incidence of a tax is placed on the
individuals, entities, or sectors of the economy that have “the legal obligation
to remit taxes to the government.” 236 In the case of DSTs, the statutory
incidence has been placed on those digital businesses with high enough gross
revenues that offer the digital goods and services targeted by the tax.237 On the
other hand, economic incidence “measures the changes in economic welfare in
society arising from a tax.”238 In other words, the economic incidence refers to
who will ultimately bear the economic burden of the tax. 239 This Article
discusses the economic incidence of DSTs, focusing on the extent, if any, that
the economic burden of DSTs is borne by the end consumers of taxed digital
platforms.
Consumption taxes are usually assumed to be borne entirely by the final
consumer.240 Many articles follow the accepted view that consumption taxes
are regressive and thus not good at promoting equity or fairness.241 However,
there has been contention over how the incidence of consumption taxes should
be addressed. In studying the distributional impact of introducing a broadbased consumption tax, one article suggested that a consumption tax is less
regressive than would be suggested because both income and consumption
taxes treat the capital income of wealthier households similarly.242 Moreover,
235. See WILLIAM M. GENTRY, U.S. DEP’T TREASURY, A REVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE ON THE
INCIDENCE OF THE CORPORATE INCOME TAX 3 (2007); Don Fullerton & Gilbert E. Metcalf, Tax Incidence
1 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 8,829, 2002), https://www.nber.org/papers/w8829.pdf.
236. Fullerton & Metcalf, supra note 235.
237. For examples of digital services placing the statutory incidence on targeted digital industries, see
HM TREASURY, BUDGET 2018 DST, supra note 18; KPMG, supra note 73, at 9; Sledz, supra note 102; and
Spain Releases Draft Bill on Digital Services Tax, supra note 106.
238. Fullerton & Metcalf, supra note 235.
239. Stephen Entin, Tax Incidence, Tax Burden, and Tax Shifting: Who Really Pays the Tax?, HERITAGE
FOUND (Nov. 5, 2004), https://www.heritage.org/taxes/report/tax-incidence-tax-burden-and-tax-shiftingwho-really-pays-the-tax.
240. Id.
241. See generally ROBERT E. HALL & ALVIN RABUSHKA, THE FLAT TAX (2d ed. 2007); Amy Dunbar
& Thomas Pogue, Estimating Flat Tax Incidence and Yield: A Sensitivity Analysis, 51 NAT’L TAX. J. 303, 321 (1998);
NICO PESTEL & ERIC SOMMER, CTR. FOR EUR. RSCH., SHIFTING TAXES FROM LABOR TO CONSUMPTION:
MORE EMPLOYMENT AND MORE INEQUALITY 16–17 (2015) (arguing that a shift from personal income tax
to VAT in Germany has a regressive impact on household budgets with budget loss amounts up to 4% of
equivalized income).
242. John Sabelhaus, What is the Distributional Burden of Taxing Consumption?, 46 NAT’L TAX J. 331, 343
(1993). The authors suggest this reasoning counters the common assumption that consumption taxes do not
tax capital income, resulting in a theoretical offset of the reduction in tax burden apportioned to high-income
earners following the transition to a consumption tax. Id.
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the OECD analyzed the distributional impact of consumption taxes, including
VATs and excise taxes, in twenty OECD countries and found that the
consumption taxes would be “roughly proportional or slightly progressive” if
analyzed for expenditure rather than income. 243
The DST has similarly been criticized in that the tax will simply be borne
in large part, if not entirely, by consumers and thus will be regressive and
unfair.244 An impact assessment on the French DST by a consulting firm found
that “[a]pproximately 55% of the total tax burden will be borne by consumers,
40% by businesses that use digital platforms, and only 5% by the large internet
companies targeted.”245 It appears then that the implementation of the DST
goes against normative concerns as to the progressivity and incidence of new
taxes.
However, these normative concerns may be misplaced due to several
underlying misconceptions over taxation of the digital economies targeted by
the DST. The first example is the two-sided platform quality of the digital firms,
which may require completely different analysis as to incidence. Second, these
large digital firms are generally considered monopolies, 246 or at least function
like them, and are affected differently by taxes and may potentially be able or
more willing to absorb the cost of the DST.247 Lastly, proponents of the DST
may be able to adopt the supportive contentions that have arisen for
consumption tax incidence because the DST essentially functions as a
consumption tax. At the least, the DST may benefit from the same arguments
against the regressive aspect of consumption tax.
2. Multisided Platforms
Multisided markets can be defined as “markets in which one or several
platforms enable interactions between end-users, and try to get the two (or
multiple) sides ‘on board’ by appropriately charging each side.”248 The firms at
the center of multisided markets, or the multisided platform firms, are
essentially intermediaries between the user-buyers (consumers) and user-sellers
243. OECD, THE DISTRIBUTIONAL EFFECTS OF CONSUMPTION TAXES IN OECD COUNTRIES 38
(2014). This study found that in the case of income, the consumption taxes followed the basic assumption
and were regressive. Id. at 25. However, under an expenditure perspective, the taxes were found to be roughly
proportional or even slightly progressive. It argued that “an expenditure-base[d] approach provides a more
reliable measure of the lifetime distributional effects of a consumption tax, challenging the general public
perception that consumption taxes are regressive.” Id. at 26.
244. Supra note 230 and accompanying text.
245. Julien Pellefigue, The French Digital Service Tax: An Economic Impact Assessment, DELOITTE TAJ
(2019),
https://taj-strategie.fr/content/uploads/2020/03/dst-impact-assessment-march-2019.pdf
(determining the pass-through rate of the French DST on merchants and consumers).
246. See, e.g., JASON FURMAN ET AL., UNLOCKING DIGITAL COMPETITION, REPORT OF THE DIGITAL
COMPETITION EXPERT PANEL (Mar. 13, 2019) (providing analysis of major tech companies as monopolies).
247. See infra Part III.A.3.
248. Rochet & Tirole, supra note 8, at 645.

22D53F6F -1778-4E8E-8A93-DA0F 31B227E7 .DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

11/16/2020 3:03 PM

2020] Digital Services Tax: A Cross-Border Variation of the Consumption Tax Debate

177

(advertisers, merchants, etc.) of the market, and their main function is to
internalize various externalities generated by the interaction between the two
groups.249 To optimally facilitate interactions, and thus maximize profits, the
two-sided platform firms must adapt their pricing strategies to the demands of
the different customer groups. 250 Examples of two-sided platform firms
include hardware and software systems like Mac OS, digital exchanges like
Amazon, peer-to-peer marketplaces such as Airbnb and Uber, as well as digital
media firms like YouTube, Facebook, and Google.251
The concept of two-sided markets is incredibly relevant to the
implementation of the DST and the overall discussion over the tax avoidance
of large digital multinational enterprises, the reasons being that “[s]ome of these
‘digital platforms’ have exploited the self-reinforcing nature of network effects,
together with the global reach of the Internet, to become dominant players in
many countries . . . . These companies are well-known to generate very large
profits but to pay, comparatively, very low effective corporate taxes.” 252
The large digital firms that appear to be the main target of the DST fit
comfortably within the definition and dominating capability of multisided
platform firms. 253 These digital platforms have established their powerful
economic presence through the internalization of cross-group externalities.
Because these firms rely on externalities to determine prices and price structure,
the typical incidence analysis attributed to one-sided markets does not cleanly
apply. Most importantly, “two-sided platform firms may find it profitable to
charge prices that are below marginal cost or even negative for one of its
product[s] (customer group). This is in contrast to conventional markets
(one-sided) where marginal cost equal to marginal revenue pricing is well
established as a guidance.”254
Recent literature on tax incidence of multisided markets in the digital
economy also shows mixed results. For example, Kind et al. found that an
increase in an ad valorem tax, like the DST,255 imposed on a digital media firm
may increase sales and reduce price if user-buyers consider the interaction with
the user-sellers (such as advertisements) as a negative externality. 256 Similar
findings occurred under analysis focused on the hypothetical increase of an ad

249. Paul Bellaflamme & Eric Toulemonde, Tax Incidence on Competing Two-Sided Platforms, 20 J. PUB .
ECON. THEORY 1, 2 (2017); Mark Armstrong, Competition in Two-Sided Markets, 37 RAND J. ECON. 668, 668–
69; Rochet & Tirole, supra note 8, at 657.
250. Hans Jarle Kind et al., Tax Responses in Platform Industries, 62 OXFORD ECON. PAPERS 764, 765–66
(2010).
251. Bellaflamme & Toulemonde, supra note 249.
252. Id.
253. Id. at 2 n.1.
254. Kind et al., supra note 250, at 766; see also Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2281 (2018).
255. Ad valorem tax refers to a tax based on the value of the property or transaction subject to tax.
256. Kind et al., supra note 250, at 774–76.

22D53F6F -1778-4E8E-8A93-DA0F 31B227E7 .DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

178

ALABAMA LAW REVIEW

11/16/2020 3:03 PM

[Vol. 72:1:131

valorem tax rate on the user-buyer side, finding that the price charged on the
user-buyer’s side fell following an increase in the ad valorem tax rate. 257
In contrast, Bellaflamme and Toulemonde found that an increased ad
valorem tax imposed on one side of a two-sided market is borne by the side the
tax is levied on—that is, the platform itself—and any competing platforms, but
that agents on the other side of the market are unaffected. 258 Additionally,
empirical analysis by Eleanor Wilking found an increase in after-tax prices paid
by consumers of Airbnb—user-buyers—following the new obligation of the
individual hosts—user-sellers—to remit the relevant tax to the digital firm.259
The market reaction in the early stage of a DST’s implementation is also
divided. Amazon and Google will pass on the DST’s cost to its user-sellers or
user-advertisers by increasing various fees imposed on them, whereas Facebook
and eBay will not.260
Such mixed conclusions of recent studies and market reaction suggest that
multisided platforms may nonetheless follow typical assumptions of tax
incidence for one-sided markets, but that conclusion may not hold true for all
digital multisided platforms.261
3. Monopoly Power and Possible Cost Absorption
Another worthy point to mull over is the monopolistic position of digital
platform firms, such as Google and Amazon. In a monopoly, firms are already
extracting maximum profits in current supply-demand, so a newly introduced
tax will not be passed on to users.262 In other words, firms will absorb the tax
incidence and will not raise prices. Applying this analysis to DSTs, if digital
firms will absorb the incidence of DSTs, then introducing DSTs is a good policy
to exploit the rent of multinational enterprises.
To explain simply, the incidence of a tax partially relies on the elasticity of
the good or service.263 Taxing the good or service would usually only result in
an increase in price, effectively shifting the burden onto the consumers. 264
However, monopolies that produce goods or services with relatively elastic

257. Sovik Mukherjee & Vivekananda Mukherjee, Tax Incidence of Two Sided Monopoly Platforms
25–27 (2017) (unpublished manuscript) (available at https://www.isid.ac.in/~epu/acegd2017/papers/Sovik
Mukherjee.docx).
258. Bellaflamme & Toulemonde, supra note 249, at 9.
259. Wilking, supra note 8, at 21.
260. See supra text accompanying notes 232 and 234.
261. See generally Wilking, supra note 8.
262. Rikita Muley, Effect of Taxes on Monopoly Equilibrium (with Diagram), ECON. DISCUSSION, http://
www.economicsdiscussion.net/monopoly/effect-of-taxes-on-monopoly-equilibrium-with-diagram/17081
(last visited Oct. 2, 2020).
263. See id.
264. Id.
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demands may instead decide to reduce prices, absorbing the cost of the tax.265
This decision results from the monopoly power that the firm exerts in the
market. Because the monopoly firm can set a lower price than equilibrium level,
the firm extracts supernormal profits derived from consumer surplus. 266
Taxation of the firm’s profits results in a reduction of excess profits similar to
the imposition of additional fixed costs.267
However, analyzing the extent of the digital firm’s monopoly power and its
possible implications on tax incidence is not easy. It requires extensive empirical
research until policy makers find reasonable results. If, however, the digital
economy subject to DSTs is indeed monopolistic, it is fair to ask whether
Amazon’s and Google’s current anecdote of passing the economic burden to
user-sellers or user-advertisers is acceptable. It further raises questions, such as
whether regulatory agencies should and could invoke a measure to adjust the
economic burden of DSTs, which are beyond the scope of this paper.
The refined policy analysis on how to design a DST and what its tax
incidence should be like is still at the early stage. The discussion above invites
tax, economics, and public finance scholars to further study the tax incidence
of DSTs. One thing clear from the discussion above is that, regardless of the
normative discussions on the tax incidence of the DST, the function and form
of the DST is essentially a consumption tax, and thus benefits from the same
arguments of efficiency and administrability on the international stage.
B. Why Not Other Types of Consumption Tax?
Another difficult question in the design and subsequent implementation of
DSTs as a consumption tax is whether there is a better type of consumption
tax to pursue, such as DBCFT (cash-flow tax) or VAT.268 In fact, DBCFT or
VAT, as indirect consumption taxes, have been considered superior forms of
taxation to turnover-based gross receipts taxes; VAT avoids taxes on business
inputs and thus produces efficiency gains and avoids tax cascading. 269
However, highly digitalized business models subject to DSTs involve a single
firm or short supply chain functioning as platforms and thus may mitigate the
potential tax cascading problem associated with turnover taxes.270 Moreover,
the traditional argument supporting a cash-flow tax or VAT may not hold true

265. See id.
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. William G. Gale, Understanding the Republicans’ Corporate Tax Reform, BROOKINGS (Jan. 10, 2017),
https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/understanding-the-republicans-corporate-tax-reform. DBCFT is
very similar to a VAT, but it can deduct wages from its base whereas VATs cannot. Id.
269. See, e.g., Karl Russo, Superiority of the VAT to Turnover Tax as an Indirect Tax on Digital Services, 72
NAT’L TAX J. 857, 857 (2019).
270. See infra Part II.C.2.
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when it comes to multisided digital platforms operating in multiple jurisdictions
for the following reasons.
First, as to the VAT, it is worth noting that there is a huge debate on the
notion of “value creation” in digital taxation discourse.271 Where is the value
created in the digital economy? In the example of Google, what factors of the
digital economy contribute to Google’s value creation the most? Is it California
where engineers have developed and are operating Google’s proprietary
algorithm? Or is it the market countries where users feed their data to the
algorithm? The debate of value creation in the digital economy resembles the
old debate on allocating tax revenue relative to extracting natural resources. Are
Western multinationals with proprietary technology for extraction and their
home countries the major contributors to the production of natural resources
and thus deserving of a greater share of tax revenue? Or are the source countries
with natural resources on their soil the major contributors to production and
deserve a larger share of tax revenue? The discussion has been far from fully
resolved. In principle, source countries are entitled to primary taxing rights on
the rent from natural resources. In effect, however, they offer various tax breaks
to attract foreign capital. International taxation could not solve the puzzle of
value creation with respect to natural resources in the past. And it is likely that
replacing a DST with a VAT may repeat the same problem as to measuring the
tax base, or the value addition.
Second and more fundamentally, neither VAT nor DBCFT would be a
good policy to accomplish what the DST debate aims to accomplish—
rewarding market countries that likely receive less than their fair share of tax
revenue under traditional tax rules. The DBCFT was proposed during the U.S.
tax reform debate in 2017 but was ultimately rejected by both the EU and the
U.S. because they considered it too aggressive and contentious.272 Unlike VAT
where exports are untaxed while imports are taxed, a DBCFT is conceptually
easier to apply to cross-border business taxation. Tax consequences of both
VAT and DBCFT follow the cash flow of the economy, but there is no cash
flow between digital firms providing digital services and user-buyers located in
market countries. Thus, the concept of “destination” in the DBCFT or VAT
may not refer to the market jurisdiction where user-buyers are located, and thus
neither would be effective in rewarding market countries.
271. See Michael Devereux & John Vella, Value Creation as the Fundamental Principle of the International
Corporate Tax System, EUR. TAX POL’Y FORUM (2018); Johanna Hey, “Taxation Where Value is Created” and the
OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit-Shifting Initiative, 72 BULL. INT’L TAX ’N 203 (2018); Susan C. Morse, Value
Creation: A Standard in Search of a Process, 72 BULL. INT’L TAX ’N 196 (2018); Wolfgang Schön, One Answer to
Why and How to Tax the Digital Economy (Max Planck Inst. For Tax L. & Pub. Fin., Working Paper 2019–10,
2019).
272. See Daniel Shaviro, Goodbye to All That?: A Requiem for the Destination-Based Cash Flow Tax, 72 BULL.
INT’L TAX’N 10 (2018); see also Janet Novack, EU Wrong To Challenge Destination Based Cash Flow Tax, FORBES
(Mar. 29, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/janetnovack/2017/03/29/eu-wrong-to-challengedestination-based-cash-flow-tax.
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In the William-Google example, cash flow exists between the service
provider (Google in the U.S.) and the user-seller (Mercedes-Benz in Germany)
and not between the service provider and the user-buyer (William in the U.K.).
The destination country in a cash flow tax is where user-sellers are located—
here, Germany. The cash flow tax or DBCFT will allocate revenue to the
destination country (Germany), although the market country, which all
proposals in the DST debate aim to reward, is the U.K .where user-buyers are
located. Given that there is no cash flow between the service provider (Google
in the U.S.) and user-buyer (William in the U.K.), how can we reward the market
countries under cash flow taxation? Thus, a pure cash flow tax and VAT might
not be the best means to reward the market jurisdiction after all.273
Also, a recent article by Bankman, Kane, and Sykes implies that a
well-designed excise tax, another type of consumption tax, would be a better
tool to extract the profits of multinational enterprises than conventional income
tax and DBCFT.274 Considering the excise tax is another type of consumption
tax, Bankman et al.’s work is likely to be in line with this Article’s promotion of
DSTs as a turnover tax.
C. Overcoming the Ring-Fencing Problem
The next issue to explore is how to overcome the limited scope of DSTs.
The limited scope of DSTs is created both by the ring-fencing, or segregating,
of certain digital business models and by the revenue threshold requirements.
Some commentators attack the revenue threshold and the resulting
discriminatory trait in support of expanding the scope of DSTs.275 However,
given that the revenue threshold requirements are necessary to sort the digital
firms with monopoly power and subject them to DSTs, 276 it could be
premature to expand the scope of DSTs by lowering the revenue threshold.
Instead, this Subpart proposes to expand the scope of DSTs to overcome the
ring-fencing problem.
Under the U.K. DST, search engines, social media platforms, and online
marketplaces are within the scope of the DST, but certain regulated financial
and payment services, the provision of online content, sales of software/
hardware, and television or broadcasting services are excluded. Thus, Facebook,
Twitter, YouTube, Google, Amazon Marketplace, Kayak, Priceline, Uber, and

273. See Alan Auerbach et al., Destination-Based Cash Flow Taxation 9–13 (Oxford Univ. Ctr. for Bus.
Tax’n, Working Paper 17/01, 2017).
274. Joseph Bankman et al., Collecting the Rent: The Global Battle to Capture MNE Profits, 72 TAX L. REV.
(forthcoming 2020) (available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3273112#).
275. See, e.g., Mason & Parada, Company Size Matters, supra note 21; Mason & Parada, Digital Battlefront in
the Tax Wars, supra note 21.
276. Supra Part III.A.3.
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Airbnb are in scope, whereas PayPal, Netflix, Hulu, Spotify, and Ubisoft are
excluded.277
The rationale of the current line drawn between the two groups is that the
policy makers envision a fundamental difference between the two business
models.278 Lifting the ring-fence may inadvertently and unexpectedly distort
the market, especially when the ring-fencing occurs due to the specific need to
distinguish one market from another.279 However, it is still unclear whether
YouTube and LinkedIn are considered social media platforms that are subject
to a DST or digital interfaces providing digital content that is not subject to a
DST, especially when considering YouTube Premium and LinkedIn Premium
services. Also, Spotify and Hulu are currently not subject to the DST because
they are classified as content providers, but they raise another line-drawing
question when they offer free or discounted services to users who do not
subscribe to their respective premium services but are then exposed to
advertisements. These line-drawing questions, which questionably subject one
company to a DST and exempt another similar company, illustrate the need to
thoroughly review and question the ring-fencing distinctions.
To examine whether there are fundamental differences between the
in-scope and out-of-scope business models, let us compare an in-scope
company (YouTube) with out-of-scope companies (Netflix and Spotify)
noticing that all three platforms offer online content.
According to Alphabet Inc.’s annual report, Google and its subsidiary
YouTube derive the majority of their revenue—i.e., 83% of their revenue in
2019—from advertisements. 280 While YouTube primarily derives revenues
from the use of engagement advertisements, 281 it generates some
nonadvertising revenue through the means of YouTube subscriptions, such as
YouTube Premium, YouTube TV, and Channel Membership.282
In contrast, Netflix is solely a content provider. As of January 2020, Netflix
was the largest internet entertainment service with over 167 million paid
memberships throughout 190 countries.283 Netflix offers digital content, such
as feature films, television shows, and documentaries, which are either originally

277. See Cui, supra note 4, at 8–9.
278. See HM TREASURY, BUDGET 2018 DST, supra note 18; see also HM TREASURY, CORPORATE TAX
AND THE DIGITAL ECONOMY 15–16 (2017); HM TREASURY, DST, supra note 74, at 9–19.
279. Bankman et al., supra note 274, at 14–18.
280. Alphabet, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 9 (Feb. 4, 2020).
281. Specifically, YouTube generally generates revenue through the use of “engagement ads.” Id. at 30.
Advertisers pay YouTube when a user clicks on the advertisement. Id. This is referred to as “cost-per-click,”
because it is a click-driven revenue. Id. However, YouTube’s engagement ads “monetize at a lower rate than
traditional [desktop] search ads.” Id. at 27. YouTube’s cost-per-click is lower than other Google platforms.
Id.
282. Id. at 32.
283. Netflix, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 1 (Jan. 29, 2020).
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created by Netflix or licensed to Netflix from other studios.284 Unlike other
streaming services, Netflix does not offer any commercials and derives no
revenue from paid advertisers.285 Most importantly, it does not provide users
the ability to share content and does not make its original content available for
free to all users who choose to watch advertisements.
With respect to the categories of content provided through YouTube, one
may discover three different types: (1) content posted by professionals
attempting to reach a wide audience, (2) content posted by amateurs for a small
audience, and (3) YouTube’s original content offered only to subscribers of
YouTube Premium or other subscription-based services. This third category of
YouTube’s original content is analytically difficult to distinguish from the
“content provider” business model of Netflix. However, while YouTube is in
part a content provider, its main purpose is monetizing user content through
the use of advertisements,286 whereas Netflix is solely a content provider.
Although one may find the above differences between YouTube and
Netflix substantial enough to justify the current distinction between the two
business models, it would be hasty to push ahead with such conclusion without
comparing YouTube and Spotify, another out-of-scope content provider.
Spotify Technology S.A. is the largest global music streaming service with
271 million monthly active users and 124 million users paying for Premium
Service as of December 31, 2019.287 Spotify has two business segments: (1)
Ad-Supported Service, a segment focused on monetizing the user base through
paid advertising; and (2) Premium Service, which is a user paid,
commercial-free, subscription service “with unlimited online and offline
high-quality streaming access” to its catalog. 288 The Ad-Supported segment
allows users similar access to content but is subject to advertisements. 289 In
2019, Spotify’s Premium Service comprised 90% of its total gross revenue,
earning approximately €6,086 million. 290 Spotify’s Ad-Supported segment
generated €678 million.291

284. Id.
285. Id.
286. Alphabet, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 31–32 (Feb. 4, 2020). YouTube Premium is one small
section of YouTube’s service. Also, YouTube has begun to offer its original content free to all users since
September 2019. Sarah Perez, YouTube Originals Become Ad-Supported and Free After September 24th,
TECHCRUNCH (Aug. 19, 2019), https://techcrunch.com/2019/08/19/youtube-originals-become-adsupported-and-free-after-september-24th/#:~:text=YouTube%20Originals%20become%20ad%2D
supported%20and%20free%20after%20September%2024th,-Sarah%20Perez%40sarahintampa&text=In%
20an%20email%20distributed%20to,customers%20after%20September%2024th%2C%202019. Premium
subscribers can watch the content ad-free, whereas non-subscribers are subject to advertisements. Id.
287. Spotify Technology S.A., Annual Report (Form 20-F) 40 (Feb. 12, 2020).
288. Id. at 46.
289. Id. at 47.
290. Id. at 50.
291. Id.
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YouTube and Spotify have extremely similar business models and offer
very similar products to users. First, both offer a commercial-free premium
service coupled with an ad-based service. Moreover, both services mainly
license content from third-party providers that the service then distributes to
users.292 Additionally, both services pay content providers based on the success
of the content on the platform. 293
A key difference between YouTube and Spotify is whether the majority of
revenue is derived from advertisements. Alphabet, Inc. generates 83% of its
revenue from advertisements, whereas Spotify generates only 10% of its
revenue from advertisements. Given that both companies offer similar digital
services—Premium Service and Ad-Based Service—it is implausible to argue
that only Spotify qualifies as a content provider that is exempt from DSTs,
based only on the fact that most users choose to subscribe to the Premium
Service, whereas YouTube users do not.
Part II.B.1 noted the problems with ring-fencing and discrimination, which
need to be addressed and overcome eventually. A DST should not be used
against big players. It is against the spirit of a level playing field. However,
considering the policy need to adopt DSTs to reward market countries and the
merits of DSTs for accomplishing such need, the ring-fencing problems should
be addressed by eventually broadening the scope of businesses subject to DSTs.
This may address the discrimination problem as well by subjecting many
non-U.S. digital firms, such as Spotify, to DSTs. Perhaps Wayfair would offer
insight on this issue. The sales tax issue discussed in Wayfair also targets the
digital economy, but the case did not involve ring-fencing or discrimination.
After Wayfair, more than thirty state and local governments have recently
broadened their sales tax base by introducing a so-called Netflix Tax on digital
content providers. 294 The fact that one type of consumption tax—DSTs—
excludes digital content providers from its scope, whereas another type of
consumption tax—state sales tax—includes the same business within its scope,
only confirms that the current line-drawing of DSTs is arbitrary and needs to
be addressed.

292. Spotify for Artists Terms and Conditions, SPOTIFY, Sec. 6 (Sep. 26, 2017), https://www.spotify.com/us
/legal/spotify-for-artists-terms-and-conditions; Terms of Service, YOUTUBE (Dec. 10, 2019),
https://www.youtube.com/static?template=terms.
293. Spotify Technology S.A., Annual Report (Form 20-F) 55 (Feb. 12, 2020). The content owner for
both YouTube and Spotify have a financial interest in the content that is licensed to YouTube or Spotify. For
example, Spotify pays a royalty fee to the content owner. The royalty fee is calculated on numerous factors,
including “Premium and Ad-Supported revenue earned or user/usage measures.” Id. Similarly, YouTube
content owners can be compensated based on the number of views of their video. YouTube Partner Earnings
Overview, YOUTUBE https://support.google.com/youtube/answer/72902?hl=en&ref_topic=9257988 (last
visited Oct. 2, 2020) (“Earnings are generated based on a share of advertising revenue generated when people
view your video. More views may lead to more revenue.”). Therefore, content owners receive compensation
from Spotify or YouTube, and thus have a financial interest in the content doing well on the servi ce.
294. Supra note 37.
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CONCLUSION
G20 and the OECD expect to offer a multilateral, long-term solution for
taxing the digital economy for a global deal by the end of 2020. However, the
discourse is largely focused on various income-tax-based proposals and does
not sincerely consider DSTs a solution. Yet, DSTs are already widespread and
considered the new status quo for taxing the digital economy. While the
critiques of DSTs contain merit and need to be addressed, the DST debate
could be viewed differently when viewing the DST as a consumption tax, which
has never been seriously discussed. This Article seeks to bring this consumption
tax perspective to the forefront, which could bring a new life to DSTs as a
solution to taxing the digital economy.
Furthermore, the timeline of the OECD’s global deal is too tight,
considering that the issue on the table will result in the fundamental overhaul
of the international tax rules that has been procrastinated for about one
hundred years. The agenda on the table is not just about taxing the digital
economy but rather taxing the entire twenty-first century economy, which is
different from the brick-and-mortar economy of the twentieth century.
Furthermore, the agenda also gives an opportunity to consider an updated
debate on consumption tax versus income tax in the twenty-first century
economy. This requires serious academic research for an extended period that
this Article aims to start.

